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PREFACE
Modern corporate takeover battles resemble closely the
feudal wars of the Middle Ages. A corporation that fears a
raid by a Black Knight builds a Castle of charter amendments
and changes in its corporate structure designed to make a
takeover difficult. Then it attempts to establish a reputa-
tion for fierce resistance to takeovers by strongly rejecting
all proposals to discuss alliance by merger. At the same
time, the serfs are pacified with increased dividends and a
shareholder relations campaign. The Count warns his noblemen
against fraternization with raiders. Frequently mercenaries,
lawyers specializing in takeover battles, are specially
retained to advise as to the design of the Castle, to peri-
odically check the ramparts and smooth the glacis and to be
available on short notice in the event of a surprise Saturday
night special attack. The King is petitioned repeatedly to
promulgate a takeover law banning from the Kingdom all raids
and raiders or at least making raids almost impossible. If
a raid does come, the Council is convened, the Clergy is
consulted and the mercenaries, if not already on retainer,
are hired.
The Board of Directors is the Council. Like the feudal
Council, it is often subservient to the Count. However,
2almost impossible and the Castle will quickly be lost. The
King demands that the Council act in good faith and on a
reasonable basis to further the best interests of the serfs,
not the Count and his noblemen. The Council almost always
obeys the King's command for they know that they live in the
Kingdom of the shareholder derivative lawsuits and the SEC's
enforcement proceedings.
The investment bankers are the Clergy. They consult the
scriptures by Moody and Standard and Poor and damn the
takeover as unfair and inadequate. They review the household
accounts and bless the continued independence of the Castle.
They comfort the serfs. They strengthen the resolve of the
Count and the Council. They know the Bishops of Wall Street
and can read their signs as they appear on the tape. They
know the mercenaries and if the need arises, they act as
emissaries to the neighboring Castles in the sometimes
desperate last-minute quest for a White Knight.
The shields of the mercenaries are their legal opinions;
the pikestaffs are their lawsuits. Their religion is
loyalty, royalty, persistence and ingenuity. Their Holy
Grail is the showstopper defense. They advise that with the
blessing of the Clergy, the Council has a reasonable basis
for rejecting the takeover bid and defending against the
raid. This protects the Council against being held to
account by the King's commissioners or the judge of the
serf's derivative lawsuit. Then, the mercenaries march
against the Black Knight in court and regulatory agencies,
3probing his lines for weak spots and fighting at every turn.
Their mission is to lift the siege. Or, at the very least
to hold the Castle until the Clergy have found a White
Knight
.
If despite the incantations of the Clergy and the sorties
of the mercenaries, the Castle is about to be invested and
the serfs are about to rebel, in rides the White Knight.
He is a neighboring Count or foreign potentate of greater
resources than the Black Knight. He too has mercenaries in
his train. He vanquishes the Black Knight, repacifies the
serfs and rebuilds the Castle. But, alas, it is the White
Knight's men who sit now at the Council table. The Count
either swears fealty to his new overlord or joins his fellow
exiles in Palm Beach.
So goeth the takeover wars.
The scriptor is deeply indebted to all the noblemen,
fellow mercenaries, and fellow squires for their support and
(linquistic) advice in writing this epic.
The scriptor also wishes to express his sincere thanks to
the noble scribes for reviewing and approving this epic.
My special thanks to that certain noble scribe who made
it possible for the scriptor to visit, study and work in the
United Counties.
INTRODUCTION
Acquisitions of United States corporations have become
increasingly complex battles for control of such corpora-
tions, as hostile tender offers are met with competing
offers, counter-offers, self-tender offers and other defen-
sive measures. Bidders and targets frequently are forced to
pursue simultaneous strategies of hindering one tender offer
while encouraging another, thereby blurring the defensive-
offensive labels traditionally applied to the participants
and their tactics. With the growing complexity of takeover
contests, litigation has emerged as an important defensive
and offensive tactic. Bidders frequently resort to litiga-
tion to pre-empt target actions and to ensure a more
favorable forum. Targets use litigation to ward off a
takeover attempt or to gain a reprieve while alternative
strategies are considered and implemented.
Target lawsuits are many and varied. Targets commonly
assert violations by a bidder of federal and state securities
laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations,
federal and state regulatory systems and, most recently,
2federal anti-racketeering laws.
The principal federal regulation of takeovers consists of
2a
section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,^
which governs proxy solicitations, and the Williams Act,
5which is the primary statute governing tender offers. Sec-
tion 14 (a) authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") to prescribe rules governing the solicitation of
proxies. The purpose of Section 14(a) and the rules promul-
gated thereunder is to prevent management or individuals
opposing target management from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate dis-
closures in proxy solicitations.
The Williams Act, the principal tender offer legislation,
has added Sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) to the Exchange
2cAct. The purpose of the Williams Act and the rules promul-
gated thereunder is to protect individual investors by
requiring the disclosure and reporting of material informa-
tion relevant to the impact of a possible acquisition of
shares or a tender offer and to allow investors sufficient
time within which to make an informed investment decision.
In enacting the Williams Act, Congress sought to protect
investors not only by furnishing them with necessary informa-
tion, but also by preventing either the target management or
the bidder from obtaining undue advantage that could
frustrate the exercise of informed choice. The SEC has
recently attempted to bolster the regulatory scheme governing
tender offers by amending several rules promulgated under the
2eWilliams Act.
Failure of the bidder to comply with the disclosure and
reporting requirements of the federal securities laws is al-
most always alleged by the target in its suit attacking the
offer. The alleged non-disclosures or misstatements cover a
2fbroad range: the bidder's purposes in making the tender of-
fer as well as any "plans or proposals" it has for the
target; g the bidder's financial statements; the impact
upon the target of the offeror's acquisition of control;
relationships between the bidder and the target; -* the
bidder's financing of the offer, including pertinent provi-
sions of loan agreements and the possible use of the target's
2k
assets to repay the loans; ' whether purchases of target
stock prior to a bid violated state or federal law, or
whether the bidder's conduct violated Rule 10b-13 of the
21Exchange Act; or, failure by the bidder to disclose sensi-
tive payments or other questionable business practices.
Furthermore Section 14(e) prohibits fraudulent and deceptive
practices in connection with tender offers.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers or
acquisitions whose effect "may substantially lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Clayton Act
provides two remedial provisions for private antitrust
enforcement of Section 7. Section 4 awards treble damage to
anyone who suffers injury in his business or property by
reason of a violation of antitrust laws, and Section 16
entitles any person threatened with loss or damage by any
antitrust violation to injunctive relief. ^ As a private
party, the target of a contested takeover may seek an injunc-
tion under Section 16 to enjoin the contemplated action by
7alleging a threatened violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
The target may seek to enjoin purchases of its stock where
the bidder's purchases are financed in violation of the mar-
gin regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant
to Section 7(f) of the Exchange Act. " Regulation U, in
general, prohibits a bank from extending credit directly or
indirectly secured by any "margin stock," and in order to
purchase "margin stock," if the stock exceeds the "maximum
2rloan value" of the collateral. Regulation X prohibits the
borrower-bidder from obtaining credit that is secured
directly or indirectly by "margin securities" in order to
purchase an amount of that stock in excess of its "maximum
2sloan value .
"
Targets are also seeking to block unwanted tender offers
under the broad provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and
2tCorrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). RICO provides that it
is unlawful to receive income from racketeering activity and
to invest such money in the acquisition of an interest in an
enterprise affecting interstate commerce.
Many states have enacted takeover statutes which impose
reporting and other regulatory burdens upon bidders similar
to or beyond those imposed by the Williams Act and sometimes
restricting the terms of the tender offer themselves. Tar-
gets have alleged violations by the bidder of those state
j. j. i_ 2vstatutes
.
8Furthermore, targets often bring common law claims against
bidders or their allies, typically alleging that the bidders
or those associated with them are breaching their fiduciary
2wduties
.
Most takeover situations in today's takeover contests are
potentially volatile and unpredictable. Given these cir-
cumstances, litigation may create opportunities for the
target and uncertainties for the bidders. Although in itself
litigation outside the antitrust area usually does not deter-
mine the outcome of a contested takeover bid, it often plays
a successful role in the target's overall strategy and on
several occasions has had a dispositive effect. However, at
this time, judicial reactions to takeover litigation appear
to be generally unsympathetic: courts are skeptical about
target claims, and reluctant to obstruct premium offers and
free market dynamics. In addition, a well-prepared bidder
will have been advised to anticipate, and be ready to defend
against, aggressive litigation. Accordingly, it is not
likely to be thwarted merely by the burden, expense, or
potential delay that litigation may cause.
Nonetheless, if the target's primary objective is to
remain independent, litigation may provide the avenue to
success, even though success usually requires a substantive
violation by the bidder that results in an injunction against
the offer and that cannot be readily cured.
Litigation may also accomplish several strategic purposes.
For one thing, it affords the possibility of delay. With the
9demise of state takeover laws, the target is likely to have
only about thirty days to implement a defensive strategy if
one is available, or to find a White Knight. Additional time
is often precious and litigation may be the only way to ob-
tain it. However, absent a reasonably strong claim for
relief, such as where the bidder is engaged in a continuing
fraud or has committed fairly egregious disclosure viola-
4tions, the courts are currently declined to delay tender
offers. Litigation also demonstrates the target's resolve,
and, in some cases, has been used as an overall strategy to
stymie and demoralize the bidder. Another strategic purpose
applies in cases where the target expects difficulty in
finding a White Knight and may have to negotiate with the
bidder to increase the offer in that situation, litigation
may be one of the few bargaining chips the target has.
However, it will be worth something only if the legal claim
is wrong, or if the bidder feels vulnerable or anxious to
avoid litigation.
Although litigation by a target is customary, it does
entail certain disadvantages. In addition to the fact that a
suit rarely stops an offer, it is expensive, will usually
generate counter litigation by the bidder, and will always
involve discovery demands on the target company. Under cer-
tain circumstances, the threat of litigation may be more
effective than an actual suit.
Commentators have written a great deal in recent years
about management resistance to takeover bids. Some believe
10
that a target management's decision to oppose a tender offer
is an ordinary business judgment and therefore protected un-
5der the "business judgment rule." Others claim that target
management ought not be afforded such latitude, arguing that
this application is illogical, inconsistent with Congress 1
goals in adopting the Williams Act, and, given the functions
performed by tender offers, ultimately unwise.
Participants in this debate have generally avoided very
close scrutiny of particular defensive tactics employed by
target managements. While the literature addresses, in a
7
rather cursory way, the propriety of certain defenses, most
of the discussion focuses on the broad question of management
resistance in general. There is, in particular, little
p
analysis of litigation against the tender offeror, a tactic
that target managers commonly employ with considerable effec-
tiveness
.
It is well known that target managers commonly respond to
unwanted takeover bids by suing the bidder* But why, ex-
actly, do target managers sue? Is it effective? Who
benefits from these suits?
In this essay, I shall try to analyze the use of such
litigation by target company managements.
I argue that target managers generally sue bidders to
thwart takeover attempts and, more importantly, often
succeed, thus maintaining their control over the target.
This result, I shall argue, is hardly in the best interest of
target shareholders or, for that matter, society at large. I
11
therefore conclude that target lawsuits should be viewed with
suspicion and perhaps subjected to rules designed to limit
the harm such lawsuits can cause.
In Chapter I, I explore the motives of litigious targets.
I briefly examine the takeover defense literature on target
litigation which indicates that target managers usually sue
bidders in order to defeat unwanted takeover attempts. I
also suggest that judicial reactions to target lawsuits
largely confirm this hypothesis.
In Chapter II, I try to provide an overview and insight
in the challenges that have been brought by targets in their
efforts to thwart takeover attempts.
I then discuss, in Chapter III, the effectiveness of such
judicial challenges with regard to their desirability as a
defensive measure in view of target shareholders' interests.
I conclude in Chapter IV by proposing reforms that would
limit harmful target litigation without unduly restricting
the ability of target managers to seek redress for legally
cognizable wrongs. I also suggest that the alleged benefits
of target litigation can be obtained more cheaply and effec-
tively under the approach that I propose.
CHAPTER I
THE GOAL OF TARGET LAWSUITS
A. WHY TARGETS SUE
Plaintiffs ordinarily file lawsuits with the goal of ob-
taining relief from allegedly illegal conduct by defendants.
One might therefore assume that targets sue bidders in order
to prevent or remedy unlawful tender offers or tender prac-
tices. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for con-
cluding that target managers often sue bidders in order to
impede unwanted offers, with little concern whether their
lawsuits assert meritorious legal claims. First, special-
ists in the strategy of control contests commonly urge the
commencement of litigation as a means of thwarting unwanted
tender offers. Indeed, the literature suggests that these
specialists view target litigation as a virtually automatic
response by any target management wishing to resist a
12takeover attempt.
For example, one lawyer observes that litigation against
the bidder is axiomatic and is "something that always gets
13done...." Another notes that target managers almost always
seek recourse in court claiming that the unwanted tender
14
offer is in violation of the Williams Act' the federal
antitrust laws, and any other laws the target's imaginative
1
5
counsel has discovered. The same lawyer notes that "[i]t
12
13
has become a reflex action for the target company to combat
an offeror by alleging violations of section 14(e) - the
antifraud provision of the Williams Act..." and that
"[a]ntitrust claims are often raised whether or not the cir-
17
cumstances warrant it."
Similarly, some have urged target managers to consider
the use of defamation actions against the bidder's management
1 8
as a weapon in corporate control battles. And even scholars
further removed from the fray of control contests have stated
flatly that "[o]ne of the most effective defensive strategies
19is to invoke the aid of courts." " In view of these ex-
amples, the following observation by the authors of a leading
text on securities regulations seems apt: "Almost without
exception, any announcement of a takeover bid is now in-
stantly followed by an injunction action filed by the cor-
porate management charging the "raider" with most of the
crimes in the Decalogue, but usually stopping short of
i. 4. 0- i.20statutory rape."
Empirical studies of target litigation report that tar-
gets litigate in approximately one-third of all takeover at-
tempts, including those that are unopposed by target manage-
21
ment. These data are therefore consistent with the
proposition that target managers often use lawsuits against
the bidder as a tactical device for resisting an unwanted
offer.
Given the strategic advice that takeover specialists
22
commonly offer and the complexity of the claims typically
14
23
asserted in such actions, it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that targets sue bidders almost reflexively as a
24defense response against unwanted offers.
Judicial reactions to target lawsuits suggest that
courts recognize the tactical nature of much anti-takeover
. . 25litigation. In some cases, courts have referred expressly
to the litigants' attempts to use the courts to further their
objectives in their struggle over the control of the target
company and have denied the target motion for a preliminary
injunction against the bidder reasoning that the target's
management were simply trying to protect their entrenched
position. Plainly, judges ar growing less patient with
this defensive tactic; they are wary of frivolous claims and
critical of target management attempts to wage control con-
27tests in the courts.
Of course, it is tempting to conclude in light of this
increasingly common judicial attitude that the courts can and
do view target lawsuits with appropriate suspicion and that
further regulation of this defensive response is unnecessary.
Proponents of this view would cite judicial disapprovals of
target litigation not as evidence of a problem in need of a
2 8
solution, but rather as proof that the courts themselves
are effectively checking attempts to use litigation im-
29properly as a weapon in control contests. To put this
somewhat differently, since a grant of relief presupposes
that the plaintiff's claim has merit, a decision that relief
is warranted obviates the danger that target managers may be
15
using litigation inappropriately to entrench themselves in
office
.
Target managers may oppose takeover attempts for many
reasons, including a good faith belief that such opposition
30
may result in a better deal for their shareholders. It
would be unfair and inaccurate to conclude that target
managers oppose tender offers only to retain their control
over a target's assets. On the other hand, target managers
can suffer serious losses in takeovers; relinquishing control
can involve an obvious loss of wealth and stature, often
31through forfeiture of firm-specific human capital.
B. LITIGATION HAS A TACTICAL VALUE
While ignoring the self-interested incentives of target
managers to fight control bids would be unrealistic, a
variety of tactical considerations can lead target managers
to file lawsuits against hostile bidders with little regard
for the underlying merits of such suits. Occasionally,
managers hope that a lawsuit will actually result in a
permanent or temporary injunction against the bid and thus
32defeat an unwanted takeover attempt. Thus, target managers
33
sometimes sue bidders under the Clayton Act, claiming that
the proposed takeover would substantially lessen competition.
Similarly, targets may bring injunctive actions asserting
violations of other substantive legal requirements, such as
disclosure requirements under the federal and state
securities laws, the federal margin regulations or common
34law. In these cases, the plaintiffs hope that the lawsuit
16
35
will be a "show-stopper" - a case in which the court finds
sufficient evidence of illegality to warrant at least a
preliminary injunction against the offeror. Issuance of even
a preliminary injunction often effectively kills a hostile
tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the bidder's ex-
's r
ecution of the offer; only the rarest of bidders would keep
an offer open under such circumstances, even if it
37
were willing to incur the considerable expense of a trial.
Of course, in order to convince the court to issue a
preliminary injunction, the target management must go a long
way toward proving illegal conduct by the bidder. Although
the standard may vary from one court to another, a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction generally must establish (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the inadequacy
3 8
of a damage remedy for the alleged wrong. Show-stoppers
are therefore rare where target managers are acting purely
tactically, with no regard for the merits of their legal
39
claims
.
A more realistic goal of target litigation is to delay
the tender offer beyond the usual minimum period of twenty
40business days. Target managers may accomplish this goal by
obtaining relief that has the effect of extending the offer.
For example, a court may respond to alleged disclosure viola-
tions by ordering that the offer remain open for a certain
period following full and complete disclosure by the bid-
41der. Alternatively, even where the target managers have
little hope of obtaining a preliminary injunction against the
17
bidder, they may be able to persuade the court to issue a
temporary restraining order that effectively delays execution
of the bid. 42
Delay can significantly enhance a target management's
efforts to resist a hostile bid. It affords managers more
time to defeat the bid by implementing a variety of defensive
43
measures. or, as a last resort, arranging for a friendly
44
merger with a "White Knight." It also increases the risk
45
and expense of the offer, which may cause the offeror to
abandon its takeover attempt. Thus, while delay does not al-
ways help managers preserve their control of the target
46firm, it is perceived as a useful strategy in control con-
tests
.
While most tactically motivated target lawsuits are
filed with the hope of blocking or at least delaying the un-
wanted offer, there are other strategic considerations that
motivate target managers to sue. First, suing underscores
the target management's determination to defeat the bid.
Litigation signals the target management's determination to
the bidder, to the market in which the target's shares are
48traded, and more particularly, to risk arbitrageurs. Since
target shareholders frequently try to avoid the risks of the
tender offer process by selling their shares to arbi-
49trageurs, the latter' s actions often determine the outcome
of control contests. Thus, it is in the interest of en-
trenched target management to convince arbitrageurs not to
tender to a hostile bidder. Litigation can help accomplish
18
that end by increasing the arbitrageur's perception of the
likelihood that the target managers will defeat or delay the
offer or at least facilitate a bidding contest. Arbitrageurs
who anticipate any of these outcomes will hold rather than
tender - either to avoid tying up their shares in a delayed
or unsuccessful offer, or in the expectation of a higher
subsequent bid.
Another tactical value of litigation is that it
allows for wide-ranging discovery, which, in addition to
being a source of expense and delay, provides target managers
with a wealth of information regarding the bidder and the
51tender offer. Much of this information may be useful for
resisting the takeover attempt, even if it is only marginally
52
relevant to target management's lawsuit.
Finally, target managers can offer to settle existing
litigation as a concession in negotiations with the bidder
for more favorable merger terms. Admittedly, this tactical
use of litigation hardly aids in resisting an ultimate
53takeover' but it does suggest yet another reason why
54
management may sue for largely strategic purposes.
In summary, resistant, self-interested target managers
have powerful tactical incentives to sue hostile bidders,
whether or not their action represents good faith pursuit of
a genuine legal claim. As a consequence, the risk that such
managers will assert frivolous claims against bidders seems
peculiarly great, especially when one recalls the apparent
eagerness of some advisers to wage the commencement of
19
55litigation as an "automatic" response to an unwanted bid.
If so, heightened concern regarding the meritoriousness of
target suits clearly seems appropriate.
CHAPTER II
CHALLENGES BY TARGETS
A. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, courts are deciding challenges to specific
actions and practice in takeover battles by looking to the
purpose of the Williams Act to guarantee that shareholders
57
receive full information about tender offers. Since the
Act was not intended either to promote or to inhibit tender
offers, courts are loath to allow its requirements to be
shaped into tools favoring either side in a takeover contest.
Nonetheless, the Williams Act has been used to challenge non-
disclosures by the bidder before, during and after a tender
offer. Similarly, targets have sued unwanted bidders under
other federal and state securities laws, federal and state
antitrust laws, margin regulations, and racketeering laws as
well as common law.
B. CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S OPEN-MARKET AND PRIVATELY
NEGOTIATED STOCK PURCHASES
Two parts of the Williams Act may apply to a bidder's
conduct outside a formal tender offer. If the bidder owns
more than 5 percent of the target's stock, it must obey the
58disclosure requirements of Section 13(d), and its dis-
closures may be challenged. The bidder's disclosures may
20
21
59
also be challenged under Section 14 (d) if its stock
purchases constitute a de facto tender offer.
Before a tender offer is announced, a prospective bidder
may accumulate up to 5 percent of a target's stock through
open-market or privately-arranged purchases before subjecting
itself to Section 13(d). Once the bidder or a group of
which it is a member acquires more than 5 percent of an
issuer's stock, however, the bidder or the group must file a
Schedule 13D disclosure statement with the SEC within ten
days. Thereafter, the Schedule 13D must be amended when
any change occurs which makes the previous disclosure inac-
fi 3
curate or inadequate. A target can sue a person or group
that has acquired 5 percent of its shares for failure to
64properly file or amend a Schedule 13D. Targets also can
claim that two or more people accumulating target shares are
a "group" for Section 13(d) purposes and therefore must file
a disclosure statement. More typically, targets allege
that the Schedules 13D filed by potential bidders are false
and misleading, particularly by concerning the potential
bidders' intent to seek control.
In addition to challenges brought under Section 13(d),
targets have alleged that pre-bid purchases of its stock are
actually tender offers conducted in violation of Section
14(d). The term "tender offer" is not defined in the federal
securities laws. Absent egregious facts (usually centering
upon the exertion of direct pressure on shareholders) courts
generally have refused to deem these pre-bid purchases tender
22
offers and have refused to integrate these purchases with
fi 7
subsequent formal tender offers.
Some courts have defined "tender offer" according to an
c p
eight-factor test proposed by the SEC. Under this test,
the court looks for: (1) active and widespread solicitation
of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2)
solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the
issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over
the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm
rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of
a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed number of
shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be
purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time;
(7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock; and (8)
public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the
target company that precedes or accompanies rapid accumula-
69tion of a large amount of the target company's securities.
Other courts have chosen a more flexible approach, focusing
on Congress' intent to guarantee that shareholders be fully
informed of all information pertinent to their decision
whether to tender their shares or not. This judicial reluc-
tance to label pre-bid purchases "tender offers" also extends
to post-bid purchases.
71
In Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM , the Second Circuit rejected
a target's claim that stock purchases by a bidder after the
termination of the bidder's tender offer were a de facto
72tender offer and violated Section 14(d). The district
23
court previously issued a preliminary injunction barring
Hanson from acquiring any additional SCM shares and from
exercising any voting rights with respect to the SCM shares
"7 "3 "7 A
it had purchased. On appeal, the Second Circuit re-
7 S
versed. The court rejected the application of the Wellman
eight factor test, preferring to look at the purpose of Sec-
7 fi
tion 14(d). In evaluating the totality of the circum-
stances, however, the court considered a number of the
Wellman factors and found them lacking. The court found no
added significance in the fact that Hanson's purchases fol-
lowed almost immediately the termination of its tender offer
and noted that Hanson had already filed with the SEC and made
public substantially the same information that SCM contended
should have been filed before Hanson made the post-bid pur-
77
chases
.
C. CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S DISCLOSURES
The three primary bases for challenging the bidder's dis-
closures are Sections 14(a), 13(d), and 14(e) of the Exchange
Act.
1 . Section 14(a) - Proxy Regulations
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to
prescribe rules governing the solicitation of proxies. One
7 8
such regulation, Rule 14a-9, prohibits false and misleading
statements in proxy materials. Although Section 14(a) does
not provide an express private right of action, the Supreme
79Court has held that rights of action exist and courts,
8
applying the broad holding of J.I. Case v. Borak
,
24
consistently have granted standing under Section 14(a) to
O 1
target corporations. In Mills v. Electric Autolite
, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of a private right of
action despite the express of private liabilities by Sections
829(e) and 18(a). Under Mills
, in order to establish a Sec-
tion 14(a) violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
defendant's proxy materials contain a material misleading
statement or omission, and (2) that the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation
materials is an essential link in the accomplishment of the
8 3transaction. There is a split in authority as to whether a
plaintiff also must establish that the defendant acted with
.
. 84
scienter
.
The definition of "materiality" is well-settled: "An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
8 5deciding how to vote." In applying the standard, the ap-
propriate point of view is that of the reasonable investor,
p c
not the sophisticated analyst. Financial projections and
other necessarily speculative information need not be dis-
closed, unless the predictions regarding future economic and
8 7
corporate events are substantially certain to hold true.
Targets have alleged that bidders obtained or sought to
obtain shareholder support through misleading proxy
• i 88materials
.
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2 . Section 13(d) - Reporting Requirement
8 9Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires a person or
group acquiring more than 5 percent of a company's stock to
Q (")
file a schedule 13D disclosure statement with the SEC.
Because Section 13(d) is a simple reporting requirement
rather than an antifraud provision, courts generally have
9
1
refused to imply a private right of action for damages.
The courts have commonly held that the only legal remedy for
misstatements in a Schedule 13D is that provided in Section
9218(a) of the Exchange Act, which concerns false findings
made with the SEC. 93
Courts are split over whether a private right of action
for injunctive relief can be implied under Section 13(d).
94The clear majority of courts have held that target corpora-
tions can seek injunctive relief under Section 13(d),
notwithstanding the availability of injunctive relief under
95Section 18 (a) .
Section 13(d) and the rules promulgated thereunder
require the filing of a Schedule 13D disclosure statement
with the SEC containing, among other information, the iden-
tity and background of the person or group making the filing,
the source and amount of funds used in making the purchases
of securities, the purpose of the purchases and the pur-
chaser's plans or proposals for future dealings with the
issuer or the issuer's securities. The most common challenge
under Section 13(d) concerns the 5 percent shareholder's
plans. However, targets have also challenged the
26
disclosures regarding the source of the 5 percent share-
97holder's funding, or the identity and background of the
9 8person or group making the purchases.
One reaction to the requirement that plans and intentions
be disclosed in detail is the so-called "waffling" dis-
9 9
closure. In Dan River v. Icahn
, for example, the bidder,
Icahn, filed a Schedule 13D containing a long list of actions
that Icahn and his associates might consider in deciding
whether to seek control of the issuer. The Fourth Circuit
approved Icahn' s disclosures.
Section 13(d) disclosure requirements also have been used
to obtain an injunction against an impeding tender offer
where the mandatory disclosure would result in the violation
102
of a pre-existing confidentiality agreement.
Section 13(d) claims can be important even after the bid-
der begins a formal tender offer. Two district courts have
enjoined tender offers and ordered rescission or divestiture
because the bidders had accumulated large blocks of shares on
103the basis of misleading Schedules 13D. In those cases,
the courts reasoned that the Section 13(d) violations allowed
the bidders to obtain "blocking positions" which inhibited
competing offers and made it difficult for the targets to
104
arrange other business communications. However, the First
Circuit has rejected a target's contention that a bidder who
already had obtained 17 percent of the target's shares held
an unfair "blocking position."
27
3. Section 14(e) - Tender Offer Fraud
i n ftSection 14(e) of the Exchange Act prohibits fraudulent
and deceptive practices in connection with tender offers.
Because the language of Section 14(e) tracks that of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the elements of Section 14(e) and Sec-
tion 10(b) violations have been deemed identical, except for
10 7the 10(b) requirement of a stock purchase or sale.
In order to establish a violation of Section 14(e), a
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has made a mis-
leading statement or omission in connection with a tender
offer; (2) that the misstatement or omission was material;
(3) that the defendant acted with scienter; and (4) that the
10 8
misstatement or omission caused plaintiff's injury. The
Seventh and the Second Circuits have held that there can be
no violation of Section 14(e) unless the prospective bidder
109
actually makes a tender offer.
In actions seeking injunctive relief, courts typically
assume that the scienter and causation elements are met if
the plaintiff demonstrates that the misstatements or omis-
sions are material. The standard for materiality under Sec-
tion 14(e) is the same as that applied in proxy contests:
whether "'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding' whether
to accept the tender offer." As with other sections of
the Williams Act, however, Section 14(e) claims are increas-
ingly seen as mooted by curative disclosures.
28
The courts consistently have implied a private right of
action on behalf of target corporations seeking injunctive
112
relief under Section 14(e). The Eleventh Circuit has
implied a private right of action to compel corrective dis-
113
closures, but has denied a private right of action seeking
114divestiture. Whether a target has a private right of
* x i 115action for damages is unclear.
Section 14(e) is the enforcement provision for Section
14(d). Section 14(d) and the rules promulgated thereunder
require the filing of a Schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the dissemi-
nation of certain information of certain information to the
target's shareholders, including the identity and background
of the bidder, the source and amount of the bidder's funds,
financial information about the bidder, and any "additional
i i c
material information."
Targets have successfully alleged a long list of defects
in bidder's Section 14(d) filings, but courts are increas-
ingly likely to reject the target's claim unless the bidder's
failure to disclose is clearly material. Thus, in Diamond v.
Arend, the court rejected a series of challenges to a
bidder's disclosures as involving immaterial or non-deceptive
issues. "The Court is not inclined to subject every tender
118
offer to a nit-picking judicial scrutiny."
(a) Failure to Disclose Control Purpose
Although nondisclosure of an intent to achieve control is
more commonly a pre-bid Section 13(d) violation, the claim
29
also can arise as a Section 14(d) violation in tender offers
119for less than 50 percent of the target's stock. The
failure to disclose adequately that the bidder presently has
control over the target also can serve as a basis for
, . .120
relief
.
(b) Failure to Disclose Post-Offer Plans
Targets often allege that bidders have failed to describe
adequately their plans to make material changes in the
121target's management or operations. However, in gauging
the accuracy of bidders' disclosures about their future plans
for the target, courts often recall Judge Ainsworth's state-
ment in one of the first cases interpreting the Williams Act:
"Though the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its
plans in the event of a takeover, it is not required to make
predictions of future behavior, however tentatively phrased,
which may cause the offeree or the public investor to rely on
122them unjustifiably."
(c) Failure to Disclose Financial Information
about the Bidder
Even in an "any-and-all" offer, courts have required that
bidders reveal substantial financial information about them-
123
selves. In Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty,
the Second Circuit enjoined a tender offer pending the filing
of additional disclosures. Judge Friendly ex-plained: "If
the bidder is in a flourishing financial condition, the
stockholder might decide to hold his shares in the hope that,
if the offer was only partially successful, the bidder might
30
raise its bid after termination of the offer or infuse new
capital into the enterprise. Per contra
, a poor financial
condition of the bidder might cause the shareholder to accept
for fear that control of the company would pass into ir-
responsible hands."
The Third Circuit's decision in Flynn v. Bass Brothers
125Enterprises ' may signal a move toward requiring bidders to
disclose asset valuation appraisals and other "soft informa-
tion." Traditionally, courts have not imposed a duty on bid-
ders to disclose such appraisals, reasoning that they could
mislead shareholders. Noting a trend within the SEC
favoring disclosure of "soft information," however, the court
in Flynn held that in an appropriate case a bidder's asset
appraisals must be disclosed. The determination whether such
information must be disclosed in a particular case requires
balancing the potential aid such information will give a
127
shareholder against the potential harm. Among the factors
to be considered are: the facts upon which the information
is based; the qualifications of those performing the
appraisal; and the purpose for which the information was ini-
128tially intended. The Delaware Court of Chancery recently
129followed the Flynn approach.
Despite this move toward greater disclosure, a potential
bidder need not reveal which firms it is considering bidding
on when it raises funds for acquisitions. Thus in Revlon v.
130Pantry Pride
, a target was unsuccessful in challenging the
31
bidder's prospectus, where the bidder had revealed its intent
131to use the capital raised to finance acquisitions.
(d) Failure to Disclose Inside Information about Target
Obtained by Bidder
132In Crane v. Westmghouse Air Brake
, the Second Circuit
held that a friendly bidder "was an 'insider* with respect to
the trading of [the target's] stock" and should have dis-
closed that it was engaging in "extraordinary buying" of
target shares "coupled with... large secret sales off the
market." 133
(e) Failure to Disclose the Offer's Potential Adverse
Impact on Target
In Sonesta International Hotels v. Wellington Asso-
134
ciates
, the Second Circuit ruled that a bidder violated
the Williams Act by failure to disclose details of a substan-
tial debt owed to the target that might have been compromised
if the offer were successful. The court also held that the
bidder should have disclosed that the target's stock might be
delisted from the New York Stock Exchange if the offer were
* i 135successful
.
(f ) Other Failures to Disclose
In Alaska Interstate v. McMillian , the court enjoined
a tender offer because the bidder failed to disclose substan-
137tial impediments to achieving control. In Valente v.
13 8Pepsico , the court held that when the bidder had specific
plans to merge with the target in the future, the bidder
13 Q
should have described the existence of appraisal rights.
32
140However, in Revlon v. Pantry Pride , the court ruled that
the bidder need not disclose the identity of a potential
target "until the offeror has definitely determined to
acquire the target corporation and finally decided on the
141terns of the offer." Finally, some courts have found
violations of the Williams Act where bidders have failed to
disclose substantive violations of other statutes, such as
the antitrust laws.
D. CHALLENGES OF THE SUBSTANCE OF A TENDER OFFER
Courts have thus far refused to sanction the use of the
federal securities laws to examine the substance of tender
offers. This refusal is rooted in the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act, which is to guarantee the availability of all
necessary information on tender offers while maintaining
strict federal neutrality between the bidder and the incum-
bent management.
143In Santa Fe Industries v. Green , the Supreme Court
held that conduct which does not involve either
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is not "manipulative"
144
within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
145
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, which prohibit the use of
"manipulative or deceptive devices" in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. Section 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with any tender offer...."
Given the similarity in language of the two provisions, one
would expect that the 10b-5 requirement of misrepresentation
33
or nondisclosure would extend to implied causes of action
under Section 14(e) as well.
147In Mobil v. Marathon Oil
, however, the Sixth Circuit
held that conduct which admittedly was not deceptive may
nevertheless be manipulative within the meaning of Section
14(e). The Sixth Circuit's rationale in Mobil was expressly
148disapproved by two other Circuit Courts of Appeal, and was
recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Bur-
149lington Northern . The law is now clear that in an action
under Section 14(e), a plaintiff may not escape the require-
ment of alleging and proving misrepresentation of nondis-
closure merely by characterizing the defendant's conduct as
"manipulative .
"
For example, courts have held that in the absence of
fraud or deception, a front end loaded, two tier tender offer
which is a tender offer for less than all of a target's out-
standing stock at one price followed by a second step merger
at a lower price, does not violate Section 14(c). In
Radol v. Thomas
, the Court of Appeals accepted the lower
court's finding that the two-tier offer was not manipulative.
The court also found that acquiescence in the two step trans-
action by the target's directors was not a breach of their
fiduciary duty and was protected by the business judgment
, 152
rule.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that,
without misrepresentation or nondisclosure, the payment of
34
"green-mail" does not violate either Section 10(b) or Section
14(e). 153
E. CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER FEDERAL
LAWS
1 . Antitrust Laws
If the bidder's control over the target may substantially
lessen competition in a line of commerce, the target can
challenge the bidder's efforts under Section 7 of the Clayton
154 . 155Act. However, in Cargill v. Montfort of Colorado , the
Supreme Court recently held that a competitor must allege an
"antitrust injury" to have standing under the Clayton Act.
Whether and how Cargill affects lawsuits brought by targets
against hostile bidders is unclear. When applicable, Section
7 provides one of the best defenses against a hostile tender
offer because antitrust violations spawned by the takeover
may be incurable.
Takeovers typically are described as horizontal, verti-
cal, or conglomerate. In a horizontal takeover, the
combining firms produce or sell the same product in the same
geographic area. In a vertical takeover, the combining firms
do not produce the same product but possess (or could
possess) a customer-supplier or supplier-customer relation-
ship. In a conglomerate takeover, the combining firms do not
produce the same product and do not share any special
relationship.
Targets successfully have challenged tender offers on the
ground that the horizontal effects would substantially lessen
35
competition. In a few instances, targets successfully have
157
alleged anticompetitive vertical effects. Targets rarely
have been successful in challenging conglomerate take-
158
overs
.
159In Cargill , the Supreme Court recently held that a
competitor must allege an "antitrust injury" in order to have
standing under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, but refused to
adopt a per se rule denying standing to competitors alleging
predatory pricing. Whether and how Cargill will affect suits
by targets seeking to forestall their own acquisition is
unclear.
Even in horizontal takeovers, courts tend to view tar-
gets antitrust claims skeptically, recognizing that "target
companies are quick to seek refuge in Section 7 against an
unfriendly takeover." Courts realize that "[t]he grant of
a temporary injunction on antitrust grounds at the bequest of
a target company spells almost certain doom of a tender
offer." As a result, courts often have looked to the
1 ft 7Justice Department's Merger Guidelines as a means for
gauging the target's likelihood of success. The Merger
Guidelines, issued in 1982 and revised in 1984, reflect a
continued reliance on economic analysis. The revisions
address five key areas: (1) market definition and measure-
ment; (2) factors that may affect the significance of con-
centration and market share data in evaluating horizontal
mergers; (3) the treatment of foreign competition; (4) the
treatment of efficiencies; and (5) the treatment of failing
36
divisions of healthy firms. The Justice Department state-
ment accompanying release of the 1984 Guidelines indicated
that "the revisions are intended to correct any misperception
that the Guidelines are a set of rigid mathematical formulas
that ignore market realities and rely solely on a static view
of the market place."
In formulating other defenses, targets must consider
whether they will compromise viable antitrust claims.
Naturally, a counter-tender for the shares of the bidder
forecloses an antitrust challenge. Contacts with potential
white knights also may hinder the target's antitrust defense
if acquisition by one of them would create comparable
antitrust problems. Several targets that have obtained
preliminary injunctions against bidders have been awarded
attorneys' fees under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Courts have refused to grant targets a private right of
action under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976. That Act amended the Clayton Act to provide for
notification to the Federal Trade Commission and the An-
titrust Division of the Justice Department and a review
period before the consummation of certain corporate acquisi-
tions including certain tender offers.
2 . Margin Regulations
Although courts generally have refused to permit bor-
rowers or investors to seek private remedies under the margin
1 6 Rprovisos of Section 7 of the Exchange Act, some courts
37
have held that targets do have standing to challenge bidders'
• , .. 169
margin violations.
Two courts, while refusing to permit a target to sue
directly under Section 7, have nevertheless suggested that a
target might have standing under Section 14 (e) to allege that
the bidder failed to disclose its Section 7 violations.
Neither court, however, found a violation of Section 14(e).
171The Court in Revlon found that there was no Section 14(e)
violation because the debt in question was exempt from margin
172
requirements, and the court in Nachman held that Section
14(e) was inapplicable because no tender offer had occurred
yet.
Margin regulations may play a greater role in battles
for corporate control as a result of the Federal Reserve
Board's recent extension of these regulations to cover junk
173bonds used to finance a takeover. Under Regulation G,
debt securities issued by a shell corporation to finance
stock purchases will be presumed "indirectly secured" for
margin purposes. The SEC reported in June, 1986, that al-
though junk bond financing has increased substantially in the
last few years, junk bonds are not now, and are not likely to
174become, the dominant method of financing tender offers*
On the other hand, the SEC also found that junk bond financ-
ing is used primarily in the largest takeover battles, and
suggested that the use of such bonds has leveled off or even
175declined since the Federal Reserve Board's action.
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3. Civil RICO Actions
Targets are seeking to block tender offers may be seeking
recourse in the broad provisions of the Racketeer Influenced
1 7 fi
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). RICO provides that
it is unlawful: (1) for any person receiving income from "a
pattern of racketeering activity" to use or invest that money
in the "acquisition of any interest" in an enterprise affect-
ing interstate commerce; (2) for any person "through a
pattern of racketeering activity" to "acquire or main-
tain... any interest in" an enterprise affecting interstate
commerce; or (3) for any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise affecting interstate commerce to "par-
ticipate. .. in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity." "Rac-
keteering activity" is defined to include a long list of
felonies, most prominently mail fraud, wire fraud, and "fraud
178
with the sale of securities." A "pattern of racketeering
activity" requires "at least two acts of racketeering
1 79
activity" within a ten-year period. The Act grants an
express civil remedy for treble damages and attorneys' fees
to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
18
reason of" violations of the Act's provisions.
The Act gives federal district courts jurisdiction over
RICO suits, but is silent on whether this jurisdiction is
exclusive or concurrent with the state courts. The federal
181district courts have split on this issue. The first State
39
Supreme Court to consider the issue, however, recently held
18 2that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO.
The Supreme Court has interpreted civil RICO for the
183first time in Sedima v. Imrex and in American National
184Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco . The Court's broad interpreta-
tion of civil RICO in those decisions may make it easier for
plaintiffs to establish RICO violations in takeover litiga-
tion.
In Sedima and Haroco , the Court rejected two judicially
created limitations on the use of civil RICO. First, the
Court held that a private RICO plaintiff need not prove that
the defendant has been convicted of predicate acts of
racketeering. Second, the Court held that such plaintiffs
are not required to establish a "racketeering injury" that is
separate and distinct from the injury caused by the predicate
acts themselves. More importantly, the Court made clear its
belief that Congress had intentionally drafted RICO with
broad language and that limitations on the use of civil RICO
must therefore come from Congress, and not from the courts.
Although Sedima and Haroco did not directly deal with the
question of whether civil RICO is applicable in tender offer
litigation, these cases have cast doubt on the continuing
vitality of pre-Sedima decisions in which courts criticized
the use of civil RICO in tender offer litigation on the
grounds that Congress intended RICO to apply to the infiltra-
tion of legitimate businesses by organized crime, and not to
18 5
"garden-variety frauds."
40
Even prior to Sedima
, several courts had approved of the
use of civil RICO in tender offer litigation. In Swanson v.
Wabash
,
the court refused to dismiss a class action by
shareholders of a target who alleged that the defendants had
failed to disclose and misstated certain material facts in
connection with a tender offer. In Hanna Mining v. Norcen
18 7Energy Resources
, the court refused to dismiss a target's
suit under RICO to enjoin a proposed tender offer. The
target alleged that the defendants committed violations of
Sections 10(b), 13(d), 14(e) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in acquiring its stock. Similarly, in
18 8Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car
, the court refused
to dismiss a target's complaint that the defendants had vio-
lated RICO by filing false Schedules 13D in connection with
the purchase of a third company's stock. Spencer, the target
company, alleged that Agency financed its purchases of Spen-
cer stock with proceeds of the sale of stock of a third com-
pany it had obtained through fraud.
While the future of RICO in tender offer litigation
remains unestablished and courts and private litigants con-
tinue their struggle to define the proper contours of a civil
RICO cause of action, Congress is taking a second look at the
. . . 189
statute.
4 . Proposed Legislation
In the 99th Congress, 64 individual bills designed to
affect hostile takeovers were introduced, but none were
190
reported out of committee. Legislation further
41
restricting takeovers is not expected to fare any better in
191the 100th Congress. Perhaps the most important of the
bills likely to be introduced is one offered by Senator Prox-
mire. His bill would prohibit buy-outs unless approved by
either a majority of a corporation's independent directors,
192
or two-thirds of its shareholders. The Reagan Administra-
tion opposes all proposed anti-takeover legislation as unwar-
193
ranted constraints on the free market.
F. CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH STATE TAKEOVER
AND REGULATORY STATUTES
1 . State Takeover Statutes
Many states have enacted takeover statutes which impose
reporting and other regulatory burdens upon bidders beyond
those created by the Williams Act.
At present, twenty-nine states impose some sort of direct
regulation on the acquisition of shares in tender offers for
corporations connected in any one of the number of ways, to
194these states. The scope of most ot these statutes is sub-
stantially similar. None of the statutes applies to an offer
unless: (1) the offer, if successful, would result in the
purchaser's ownership of a certain percentage of any single
class of the outstanding stock of the target; and (2) there
is some connection between the target corporation and the
195involved state. The statutes are roughly split as to
whether the tender offer must result in five percent or ten
196percent ownership in order for the restriction to apply.
The most common test for determining whether there are
42
sufficient connections between the involved corporation and
the regulating state considers whether the corporation is
either organized under the laws of the state or has both its
principal place of business and substantial assets in the
. . 197
state
.
Like the Williams Act, most current state takeover laws
both require disclosure of information and restrict the terms
of the offer themselves. While the information to be
disclosed is for the most part the same as that required by
19 8
section 14(d), J the timing of the disclosure often differs
from that under section 14(d) . A large number of states will
not allow a tender offer to commence unless a filing has been
made with the appropriate state authorities some time
199beforehand. Additionally, most states allow the state of-
ficial charged with the enforcement of the statute to delay
the offer by holding a hearing to determine whether the
requirements imposed by the statute have been met.
With regard to restrictions on the terms of the offer,
state statutes are also in many respects similar to sections
14(d) and 14(e) of the Williams Act. It is in the way in
which some of these requirements are to be met - most par-
ticularly with regard to matters of timing - that the state
and federal schemes differ most importantly. Many states
require that offers remain open for periods of time longer
201than the federally mandated twenty days. Also, in many in-
stances, the withdrawal provisions differ from those in sec-
202tion 14 (d) .
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Many state statutes contain provisions not found in the
Williams Act. They commonly require that all offers extend
to state residents as well as non-residents and that the
terms of the offer be substantially the same for residents
203
and nonresidents. A small number of statutes contain
provisions allowing those portions of the statute found un
constitutional or otherwise invalid to be severed from the
204
remainder of the statute without invalidating the whole.
An action to enforce a state takeover law, initiated
either by the target or by a state official, can seriously
impede the bidder's takeover attempt.
When targets sue to enforce a state statute, they
frequently do so in state court and join subsidiaries or
other parties whose presence in the litigation will defeat
diversity jurisdiction. This prevents the bidder from remov-
205ing the case to federal court. The bidder may bring an in-
dependent action in federal court to challenge the state
law's constitutionality, but the abstention doctrine could
•J A C
preclude a speedv resolution of the issue.
To avoid this result, immediately upon commencing their
offers, bidders commonly institute pre-emptive federal court
lawsuits challenging each potentially applicable state
statute. By filing first, and by alleging that the target is
acting under color of state law in violation of a 1983
207
suit, the bidder also should escape the Anti-Injunction
_
. 208Act.
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Bidders typically allege that the challenged statutes
violate both the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United
States Constitution. State takeover statutes thus often im-
pose burdensome requirements on bidders. However, since the
209Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. Mite
, many cases have
invalidated such laws.
However, on April 21, 1987, the United States Supreme
Court in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
210America
, upheld an Indiana statute that severely restricts
the ability of offerors to gain control of a target corpora-
211 . . .tion. The Court deviated from the decisions emanating from
the circuits over the past four years in holding that the
statute does not impermissibly interfere with interstate cor-
porate transactions nor conflict with Federal Securities
212 .Laws . The Court stated that the statute was within the
state's authority to regulate domestic corporations and held
that the statute does not prevent or unduly delay tender
offers, but only provides regulatory procedures designed for
213the protection of the corporation's shareholders.
2 . State Regulatory Statutes
Many states also have enacted statutes affecting
acquisitions in certain regulated industries. Most litiga-
tion to date has involved the insurance industry. Although
courts have divided on the constitutionality of these
statutes, at least two district courts have held that state
statutes regulating acquisitions of insurance companies enjoy
45
214blanket protection under the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
215thus are not preempted by the Williams Act.
G. CHALLENGING THE BIDDER UNDER STATE COMMON LAW
Targets often bring common law claims against bidders or
their allies, typically alleging that the bidders or those
associated with them are breaching their fiduciary duties.
2 1 f>
In Martin Marietta v. Bendix
, the Delaware Supreme
Court relied upon fiduciary duty principles to deny Martin
Marietta's motion to enjoin a Bendix shareholder meeting that
had been called to adopt certain anti-takeover amendments.
Bendix had made a tender offer for Martin Marietta, who
responded by making a counter-offer for Bendix, and sought
the injunction to prevent Bendix from erecting new obstacles
to Martin Marietta's offer. Because Bendix would obtain a
majority of Martin Marietta's shares first, the Delaware
Supreme Court reasoned that Martin Marietta would owe a duty
to Bendix: "In seeking preliminary relief below, Martin
[Marietta] is in effect asking the Court ... to assist it in
a violation of a duty to its own majority shareholder, Ben-
d.
1. .
—
I I
IX .
However, as a practical matter, suits solely relying
upon common lav; claims of breach of fiduciary duty usually do
218
not succeed. In Treadway Companies v. Care , for example,
the target, Treadway, alleged that one of the target's direc-
tors was affiliated with the bidder, Care Corporation.
Treadway claimed that this director breached its fiduciary
duty to Treadway because he knew of Care's tender offer in
46
advance and, without disclosing that information to Treadway,
219
sold his 14 percent interest in Treadway to Care.
Likewise, in Hi-Shear v. Klaus
, the Ninth Circuit held
that the target could not show irreparable injury and vacated
a district court's order enjoining the tender offer. The
target had alleged that the offer was based on confidential
proprietary information concerning the target and its finan-
cial prospects which the bidder had received from a former
221target director. The Ninth Circuit held that the target
"had not demonstrated, nor could it demonstrate, that it
would suffer injury not compensable by money damages from
[the former director's] alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
222
assuming, but not deciding, that a breach had occurred."
Another impediment to fiduciary duty claims in tender
offer litigation is standing: the duty allegedly violated
must extend to the plaintiff rather than some third party.
223Thus in Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing , the bidder alleged that
an investment adviser allied with the target breached its
fiduciary duty to its clients by failing to vote proxies
received from those clients in favor of the bidder's slate of
directors. The court dismissed the claim, stating that if
the investment advisor "has violated a duty, the cause of ac-
224tion must be brought by one of its clients."
225
In the well-publicized Pennzoil litigation, a Texas
state court jury awarded Pennzoil Co. $10.53 billion in
damages after finding that Texaco Inc. had improperly seized
O p C.
ownership of Getty Oil Company from Pennzoil. In December
47
1983, Pennzoil launched a $100 per share tender offer for 20
percent of Getty's stock. In January 1984, the Getty board
voted to accept the offer. Although Pennzoil acknowledged
that no formal documents were ever executed, it argued that
this favorable vote, a jointly prepared news release, some
handshakes and even a champagne toast, represented a binding
227
contract. Getty apparently felt differently, and several
days later accepted a higher bid from Texaco. After a failed
2 2 8
attempt to block the resulting merger, Pennzoil filed suit
against Texaco for inducing Getty to breach its "contract"
with Pennzoil. The Texas jury awarded Pennzoil the full
$7.53 billion in actual damages it sought, along with $3 bil-
229lion in punitive damages and $470 million in interest. On
December 10, 1985, Judge Soloman Casseb affirmed the ver-
230 . ...diet. Texaco then successfully applied for an injunction
to preclude a $12 billion appeal bond and to prevent Pennzoil
231from enforcing the judgment while Texaco appeals.
H. JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS BY THE BIDDER
The primary remedy available to targets is injunctive
relief. However, absent incurable hindrances, such an
antitrust violations, courts generally will enjoin an offer
only temporarily, pending cure of all Williams Act viola-
232tions. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper , for example, the
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in enjoin-
ing a prospective bidder from voting shares purchased during
the period that the bidder had failed to file a Schedule 13D.
The Court concluded that, because the prospective bidder
48
eventually filed a proper Schedule 13D, no basis for injunc-
tive relief existed.
Despite Rondeau'
s
holding that shareholder who sell "at
an unfairly depressed price have an adequate remedy by way of
234
an action for damages, several district courts sub-
sequently imposed severe equitable sanctions on bidders, who
obtained shares by violating the Williams Act. In Hanna
• . 235Mining v. Norcen Energy Resources , the court held that an
order requiring the bidder to divest all shares purchased
2 3 fi
under a false Schedule 13D was warranted. Likewise, in
237General Steel Industries v. Walco National Corp. , the
court ordered that the bidder "offer rescission to all
[target] shareholders that sold in the open market during the
period of its noncompliance [with Section 13(d)] and that the
2 3 8
offer be enjoined pending the completion of that process."
Recently, however, courts have shied away from drastic
239
remedies. In MacFadden Holdings v.J.B. Acquisition Corp.
,
for example, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's
injunction ordering a bidder to return shares tendered to it.
The district court had found that the tender offeror mis-
represented its intention to accept shares before obtaining
FCC approval. The Second Circuit concluded that there had
been no misrepresentation.
The Fifth Circuit, in Gearhart Industries v. Smith In-
240ternational
, reversed the district court's preliminary in-
junction against a tender offer. The lower court had en-
joined the tender offer to prevent the bidder from reaping
49
the benefits of the illegal "blocking position" it had
obtained by virtue of its failure to disclose its control
purpose in its original Schedule 13D. The Fifth Circuit
rejected the lower court's reasoning and held that the in-
241junction was "not justified." Noting that " [t]he sole
purpose of the Williams Act is full and fair disclosure," the
court held that this purpose was satisfied when the bidder
242
amended its Schedule 13D to indicate its control purpose.
The court concluded that this amendment "cured any previous
violation of Section 13(d) , at least so far as to preclude
243injunctive relief.""
244In Dan River v. Icahn , the district court permitted a
tender offer to proceed once the bidder's disclosure state-
ments were corrected, but ordered that the bidder's stock be
"sterilized," - that is, prohibited from voting. The court
sterilized both the shares that the bidder already owned and
the shares that the bidder was to purchase pursuant to the
offer. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that "the order
'sterilizing' [the bidder's] stock cannot be justified on the
245basis of the insufficient disclosure alleged." The court
emphasized that corrective disclosure is the normal remedy
246for inadequate disclosure. Noting that "the thrust of the
disclosure laws is to protect shareholders, not management,"
the court concluded: "Manifestly, the 'sterilization' order
affords shareholders no more 'truthful and complete' informa-
tion than that already provided by [the bidder] in its
filings
.
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Likewise, in San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real
248Estate Investment Trust of America , the First Circuit held
that the district court should lift its preliminary injunc-
tion against a tender offer once the bidder makes "sufficient
disclosure ... to equip [the target's] shareholders to make a
249decision." Nonetheless, the First Circuit did not preclude
remedies beyond corrective disclosures. Indeed, the court
endorsed as "sensible" the SEC ' s threefold test for determin-
ing whether additional relief is appropriate. The SEC ' s test
asks the district court to consider "(1) whether a substan-
tial number of shares were purchased after the misleading
disclosures and before corrective disclosure, (2) whether the
curative disclosure occurred simultaneously with or on the
eve of a tender offer, and (3) whether the violation was
250
egregious." Moreover, the First Circuit specifically
recalled Judge Friendly' s comment in Electronic Speciality
251Co. v. International Controls Corp
.
, that "[i]f the court
believes the offeror has improperly depressed the price of
the stock before making the offer, it can require rescission
252
and enjoin further solicitation for a period...."
CHAPTER III
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LITIGATION IN DEFEATING HOSTILE BIDS
A. LITIGATION TO RESIST UNWANTED BIDS
Given that entrenched targets are moved by a variety of
tactical considerations to sue bidders, there remains the
question whether litigation actually helps targets to resist
hostile takeover bids. For a variety of reasons, one must
conclude that it does.
First, whatever the specific reason for using a lawsuit
253tactically in a control contest, one thing seems clear:
the principal goal of litigious targets is to maintain the
company's independence. Although litigation, like other
254defensive measures, often precedes a higher offer by the
original or a subsequent bidder, targets sue bidders
255primarily to thwart takeover attempts. " One simple measure
of the effectiveness of litigation as an anti-takeover
device, therefore, is the frequency with which litigious tar-
gets succeed in maintaining their control over the company
threatened by a hostile takeover.
Empirical studies suggest a significant success rate for
litigating targets. For example, in his study of one hundred
litigious target defenses, Gregg Jarrell, ex-Chief Economist
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, found that the
51
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ore
target remained independent in twenty-one cases. In
257
another empirical study, Michael Rosenzweig, suggests that
litigation is the single most effective defense used by tar-
25 8gets that successfully preserve their independence. Based
on his analysis of a number of defeated hostile tender offers
in which the target remained independent for at least one
year, combined with stories on each tender offer in the Wall
Street Journal, Rosenzweig determined that target managers
employed defensive measures in forty-five of fifty-three
cases, thirty-nine of which included litigation against the
259bidder. In twenty-two of the thirty-nine cases, the
bidder's defeat was the result, directly or indirectly, of
p c n
relief granted by the court.
It thus appears that litigation helps targets fend off
hostile bids in a significant number of cases since no other
defensive measure has accounted for as many cases of success-
2 6 1ful target defense. The question that arises consequently
is whether there is a sense in which litigation is an
"effective" defensive measure in cases in which the target
does not remain independent?
In one sense, litigation is a potent anti-takeover
device even in contests that culminate in a change of con-
trol. Litigation may be used to delay an unwanted tender
offer. Delay, it turns out, correlates highly with
multiple-bid contests for targets. In other words, the
longer a tender offer is delayed, the more likely it is that
additional, higher bids for the target will emerge. It
53
follows that targets may use litigation, in effect, to stimu-
late competitive bidding for the target's shares.
Provoking an auction is an effective means of resisting
an initial bid; initial bidders usually fail to win control
264
of targets in multiple-bid contests. But, it is also true
that targets rarely remain independent once an auction
ensues: empirical evidence suggests that there are few
multiple-bid contests among those tender offers in which the
pec
target is not ultimately taken over. Thus, while litiga-
tion can help a target to retain control, in other cases it
may actually facilitate a change of control, albeit to a sub-
sequent bidder at a price higher than the initial offer. In
these cases, obviously, litigation is not ultimately helpful
to entrenched targets.
It is also worth noting that, not surprisingly,
shareholders of acquired firms fare significantly better in
auctions than in single-bid takeovers. Jarrell, for example,
concluded from his multi-method investigation of the returns
of shareholders from competing bids that "auctions are quite
I £ a- II 2 6 6lucrative for targets
.
Consequently, one might argue that target litigation is
laudable and the conclusion Jarrell draws from his study is
that:
"Target litigation [is] a strategic weapon that
benefits shareholders by delaying the execution of the
offending offer. This delay increases the likelihood
that a higher offer will be made by the original bidder
or others ....
54
. .
.
[L] itigating targets are very frequently the
beneficiaries of delayed auctions or improved bids by
the original suitors. The high frequency of these
auctions and the large benefits they produce for target
shareholders dominate the foregone losses [sic] in the
cases where litigation helps to prevent takeovers....
This finding. .. suggests that most target litigation
should be viewed as a value-maximizing gamble un-
dertaken by managers in the best interests of their
shareholders .
"
The author, however, suggests that target litigation as
a general matter is likely to be harmful to the interests of
target shareholders. Even if there is an argument for
delaying tender offers and stimulating competitive auctions;
it does not follow that litigation is the best way to obtain
that delay. Even if delay-induced bidding contests are
desirable, such delay can be accomplished more cheaply and
directly by means other than target litigation."
B. LITIGATION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF TARGET
SHAREHOLDERS?
Certain observations regarding takeover activity seems
beyond dispute. First, shareholders of targets that are ac-
quired in tender offers generally realize substantial
269gains. Second, those gains are usually even greater if
270the acquisition follows an auction for the target.
Third, certain forms of target management opposition to
271takeover bids commonly elicit an auction; notable among
these, of course, is litigation that succeeds in delaying an
initial bid.
Some commentators have concluded on the basis of these
observations that litigation is in the interests of
55
272
shareholders. Others have responded that permitting
target managers to stimulate auctions is not, as a general
273
matter, in the best interests of target shareholders.
The latter commentators suggest that allowing managers to
elicit a bidding contest may raise the price received by
target shareholders ex-post, in a given transaction, but
only by raising the expense anticipated by a potential bid-
der ex-ante, thus reducing the number of expected wealth-
274increasing bids.
However interesting and important it may be, the author
argues that one need not reach the auction question in order
to conclude that litigation is on balance harmful to target
shareholders. Even if it is correct that opposition to a
takeover bid may increase the wealth of target shareholders,
such argument ignores the implications of a target
management's serious conflict of interest and the substan-
tial fact that some litigious target managements success-
fully maintain their control over the target and thereby
deprive their shareholders of substantial gains. Empirical
studies show that the price of target shares generally falls
275to its pre-offer level following an unsuccessful bid and
some commentators thus concede that remaining independent by
thwarting a takeover attempt is never a beneficial outcome
2 7 fifor target shareholders.
It is almost certain that the avoidance of takeovers by
litigious targets is not accidental; that, indeed, avoiding a
takeover is the target management's goal in hostile takeover
56
threats. First, a target management's interest in retaining
control over the target is a powerful motive that must be
recognized. Second, the takeover defense literature suggests
that if any outcome of vigorous management opposition is -
from a management's point of view - second best, it is
provoking an auction that results in a successful subsequent
277bid. Specialists advise target managers to use lawsuits in
order to resist takeover, even though they recognize that
sometimes resistant target managers will eventually lose to a
different bidder or to a higher offer from the initial bid-
2 7 8der. Third, in cases that are not settled, target managers
279
almost always lose.
Most troubling for those proclaiming that target litiga-
tion is in the interests of the target shareholders is the
significant number of cases in which litigious managers ac-
2 8tually preserve their control of the target. The fact is
that managers by winning legal takeover battles forsake sub-
stantial premiums in cases in which auctions do not develop.
Only if one attributes to target managers the good faith
belief that remaining independent is beneficial for target
shareholders despite the substantial short-term gains that
2 81
are thereby sacrificed - an attribution that appears
plausible only if one ignores a target management's
self-interest in preserving control - is the proportion of
cases in which litigation thwarts takeovers consistent with
2 8 2the "shareholder welfare theory of litigious defense." In
summary, even if litigation is associated with auctions that
57
increase target shareholder returns, it is difficult to
believe that in the usual case target managers litigate with
the intention of provoking an auction. Target managers sue
bidders hoping to defeat the bid; if their hopes are real-
ized, the deleterious wealth effects for target shareholders
may be substantial.
This alone might suggest that litigation is too costly a
means of stimulating auctions and is not, therefore, in the
interests of target shareholders. But the case for target
litigation seems even weaker when one examined more closely
the relationship between litigation and auctions. Some com-
2 8 3
mentators argue that litigation stimulates auctions, argu-
ing that target management opposition correlates with
competitive-bid contests. This would assume that every tar-
get management opposition necessarily includes litigation and
would attribute the higher incidence of auctions in opposi-
4. 4.U 1 '4. 284tion cases to the lawsuits.
While indeed litigation is quite often included in a
2 8 5
resistant management's defensive arsenal, it appears
nearly impossible to know whether it is litigation,
resistance generally, or something else that provokes auc-
tions. A high frequency of competitive bid contests appear
to be associated with delay. Such delay may be caused by
target litigation in particular or by target opposition in
general but one "cannot conclude ... that litigation is essen-
tial to the delay that correlates with a greater incidence of
287
auctions
.
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C. THE DESIRABILITY OF LITIGATION AS A MEANS OF DELAYING
TENDER OFFERS
Even if one assumes that litigation plays a role in
delaying tender offers and that delay is desirable because it
facilitates bidding contests, it does not follow that target
lawsuits offer a preferred method of securing such delay.
Litigation is very expensive. Takeover specialists of-
ten cite the cost of defending against lawsuits as a virtue
2 8 8
of the litigation strategy. However, if delay is a virtue,
it can be accomplished with a great deal less expense. For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission could
2 8 9directly delay takeover bids by amending Rule 14e-l to ex-
tend the required minimum period for tender offers beyond
4- a 290twenty days.
Some might oppose such an amendment, however, on the
ground that greater delay would not always benefit target
shareholders. Thus, amending rule 14e-l also might increase
the risk and expense of all tender offers, possibly reducing
291the incidence of value-increasing bids. More specifically,
extended delay might disadvantage target shareholders in cer-
tain cases - for example, by scuttling the one bid that has
been made in circumstances in which additional bidders are
unlikely to emerge. A possible virtue of litigation as a
source of delay is that target managers can refrain from
suing if that seems desirable. Litigation, in other words,
affords target managers the ability to trigger delay or not,
as they deem appropriate.
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This argument, however, ignores the implications of a
292target management's conflict of interest and the empirical
evidence of litigation's potency as an anti-takeover
293 . .
strategy. Target litigation appears to be in some sense a
gambling game; a lawsuit may delay an initial bid and provoke
an auction, but given the motives of litigious target
294
managers and the role that litigation can play in defeat-
ing hostile bids, the risk that the lawsuit will instead
deprive target shareholders of a large premium and possibly
block a value-increasing redeployment of the target's
295
assets is not neglectible.
This risk could be substantially reduced without fore-
going the perceived benefits of management-triggered delay by
adopting a rule that would give target managers discretion to
delay the consummation of a tender offer for some specified
period, simply upon request. Rule 14e-l might be amended in
a slightly different manner, for example, to permit target
managers to extend the minimum tender offer period on a
showing that such a delay might help them secure a higher bid
296 .for the target. By comparison, a lawsuit against the bid-
der seems very costly, for it not only involves substantial
direct expense, but also carries with it the distinct pos-
sibility that a tender offer in the shareholder's interests
will be thwarted and that no competitive auction will emerge.
Thus, if a principal justification for target litigation is
its (assumed) role in delaying tender offers, that seems to
297be scarcely any justification at all.
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D. OTHER BENEFITS OF TARGET LITIGATION
Commentators who support takeover defensive measures
sometimes argue that certain measures are justifiable at-
2 9 8tempts to prevent bidders from either "raiding" " the target
299
or exploiting the "prisoner's dilemma" that often con-
fronts target shareholders. These commentators claim that
litigation enables target managers to preclude bidders from
manipulating the prisoner's dilemma to gain control of the
target's assets for something less than their fair value and
that litigation therefore can be the most efficient means of
i • 4-u • t a • i 300solving the prisoner's dilemma.
The author disagrees. The notion that bidders can gain
301
control of targets with value-decreasing offers is incon-
sistent with a competitive acquisitions market; in theory
competition in the market for corporate control should
protect target shareholders from bids that are successful at
302less than the best takeover price. Empirical evidence
tends to support this hypothesis: studies show that target
shares, including those that are not purchased by the bidder,
generally reflect significant capital gains as a result of
303
successful tender offers. There appears to be no evidence
to support the claim that bidders acquire targets through
value-decreasing offers.
Some commentators have observed that competition among
potential bidders may not be sufficient to protect target
. . . 304
shareholders from value-decreasing acquisitions. Essen-
tially, they note that the incentives of firms to compete in
61
the market for corporate control may be less than those that
typically operate in other competitive markets. In most
markets, rents are competed away over time, and market actors
are induced to bid against one another in order to capture
these rents in the short term. In the market for corporate
control, where competition generally involves a series of
revised bids, a potential competitor may be outbid without
ever having purchased any target shares, and therefore
without ever having captured any rents. Since the result of
competition in the corporate control market may be to deprive
all competitors, and even the ultimate winner, of any of the
305gains from acquiring control of the target, the incentives
to compete may be significantly reduced, particularly given
"i Of.
the nontrivial expense of revising a bid.
The above observations suggest that mechanics other than
competition may be required to protect target shareholders.
But of those that come to mind, allowing target managers to
litigate seems the least desirable, in part because of the
307direct and indirect costs involved, and in part because
litigation, unlike other defensive mechanisms one can
imagine, often imposes on target shareholders the wealth-
30 8decreasing effects of remaining independent.
For example, one might solve the prisoner's dilemma by
adopting rules that allow target shareholders to tender
either "approvingly" or "disapprovingly" with success of the
bid dependent upon tender of a certain number of "approving"
309tenders. This would disable bidders from exploiting the
62
pressures and distortions to which target shareholder deci-
sions are currently subjected without preventing value --
310increasing bids from reaching the shareholders. Moreover,
the costs of such a mechanism would almost certainly be less
. . 311than those associated with target litigation.
Alternatively, allowing target managers to make self-
tender offers in response to hostile bids would, if subject
to certain conditions, facilitate the defeat of value-
decreasing bids without empowering managers to veto value-
312increasing offers. Again, this mechanism appears to
313involve significantly less expense than litigation.
In summary, even if one believes that the prisoner's
dilemma poses a real problem in takeover situations, that
does not appear to justify target litigation. The presumed
benefits of litigation can be better and more cheaply ac-
314
complished through other means.
E. THE SOCIAL COST OF TARGET LAWSUITS
The above paragraphs of this Chapter thus far have con-
sidered mainly the direct expense of litigation. Arguably,
the more serious drawback to target lawsuits is the social
cost they can impose.
As a general proposition, competitive markets facilitate
the allocation of resources to their highest-valued uses.
Some commentators see takeover battles as a particular il-
lustration of this principle. They view the hostile tender
offer as a transaction in the competitive market for cor-
porate control, in which managers of the bidding and target
63
firms vie for the right to control allocation of the target's
315
shares. Under such a view, two conclusions follows: (1)
an important function of takeover activity is to promote an
efficient allocation of corporate resources; and 92) that
function cannot be performed unless the competition between
the rival management teams is a fair one.
Target litigation can undermine this fair competition by
conferring a significant advantage on target managers in con-
317trol contests with outside bidders. Significantly, no
safeguard prevents target managers from using litigation to
block value-increasing offers. Thus, self-interested
managers may sue in order to retain their control of the
target, even where a successful bid would plainly move the
318target's assets to a higher-value use. Alternatively,
target managers may sue one bidder in order to facilitate an
inferior offer from a competing bidder who promises the
319
managers side payments or a more attractive deal. The
social cost of either result is substantial, for both produce
suboptimal allocation of the target's resources. Requiring
target managers to comply with standards that would address
their conflict of interest might go a long way toward reduc-
. . . . 320ing this cost.
In addition, maintaining the status quo with respect to
target litigation may impose a different, equally troubling
cost on society. Litigious target managers have complex
motivations, but the management's self-interest in takeover
3 21
settings can be overwhelming. '' For example, target managers
64
may convince themselves in good faith that preserving the
target's independence is in the best interests of its
322
shareholders. Similarly, they may readily accept the
advice of lawyers to sue a bidder, without carefully
scrutinizing the merits of the legal claims they intend to
323
assert. In both cases, the target managers' belief that
they are acting properly and in their shareholders' interests
may be mistaken, because they may be responding - even if to
some extent unknowingly - to the understandably strong urge
to prevent their own ouster. The law can play an important
role in this setting by reducing the likelihood that managers
will make such mistakes. Conversely, there is significant
symbolic value in legal rules that permit or inadequately
discourage such conduct; managers may take comfort that
society, through its legal order, supports their decision to
324
resist takeovers through litigation.
The cost thus imposed by current law is substantial, not
only because it permits target managers to behave in a self-
regarding way, but also because it represents a missed oppor-
tunity to signal clearly to managers that society disfavors
325
self-interested behavior. There may be other self-
interested corporate conduct that legal rules cannot as
3 "7 f\
effectively police. Given the inherent limitations of
legal rules, the regulation of undesirable conduct that is
within the law's reach can be useful for communicating
society's disapproval to those who operate beyond the law's
327
compass
.
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Accordingly, quite apart from the harm that target
litigation can cause target shareholders and society by
impeding value-increasing takeovers, one should favor legal
rules that would respond to a management's conflict of inter-
est and reduce its temptation to sue bidders without care-
fully determining that a lawsuit is actually justified.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The courts have generally held that target managers are
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule
when implementing takeover defensive measures; so long as
managers act in good faith and with a rational business pur-
pose, resisting a hostile tender offer will not subject them
3 2 8to liability for breach of their fiduciary obligations.
This general proposition has been applied to a number of
329
specific defensive responses including target litiga-
330tion. Thus, existing legal rules encourage target lawsuits
by insulating litigious target managers from liability for
fiduciary breach. Target shareholders who lose substantial
331takeover premiums because of successful litigious defenses
have little recourse against their managers.
Some commentators have responded by arguing that target
management's conflict of interest in control contests should
preclude application of the business judgment rule and bar
332 333
some or all takeover defenses. All of these commen-
tators who mention target litigation - without extended dis-
. . 334
cussion - claim that it should be prohibited. My analysis
leads me to be sympathetic with this conclusion: litigation
by takeover targets can adversely affect target shareholder
66
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wealth " and significant social costs. Accordingly, one
can readily understand why some would deny target managers
standing to assert claims against hostile bidders.
Nevertheless, a flat prohibition of target litigation
would be dangerously and needlessly radical. Even assuming
that target managers are often inappropriate plaintiffs and
that manager-asserted claims frequently tend to be frivolous,
hostile bidders do sometimes violate the law and thereby in-
337flict real harm on the target firm or its shareholders.
If one bars direct target actions against the bidder, who
will protect the target and its shareholders against truly
illegal conduct? More broadly, if one eliminates targets as
plaintiffs, are there other private plaintiffs to help en-
force the law?
One possible answer is to rely on actions by target
shareholders. Shareholder litigation, however, is fraught
with problems of its own. First, shareholder action, whether
339direct or derivative, may involve conflicts that are at
least as intractable as those that infect actions by target
managers. Because the law has responded to the "free-rider"
problem of shareholder litigation by permitting the recovery
of attorneys' fees and expenses in actions that confer a
340benefit on the corporations in question, the incentive to
bring shareholder suits belongs more to the plaintiff's
lawyer than the plaintiff himself. As a consequence, the
relevant private enforcer in shareholder actions is someone
whose interests may be adverse to the very shareholders he
68
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nominally represents. Plaintiff's attorney, for example,
may be induced to accept collusive settlement of a claim that
effectively trades a low corporate recovery for a high fee
342 ....
award. Moreover, lawyers may find it in their interest to
assert frivolous claims entirely for their settlement
, 343
value
.
One may want to criticize target lawsuits partly on the
ground that target management's conflict of interest can
cause it to litigate principally for tactical reasons,
resulting in the frequent assertion of mortal claims against
bidders. This would suggest that the lawyer, the real plain-
tiff in shareholder suits, is influenced by his own conflict
of interest and may also find the temptation to assert
frivolous claims irresistible. As a result, one might
legitimately question whether shareholder actions represent a
344
superior means of enforcing legal claims against bidders.
In addition, a rule barring target lawsuits but permit-
ting actions by target shareholders would cause unnecessary
conceptual strain. For example, how, under such a rule,
would courts treat lawsuits in which the plaintiff-
shareholder is also an officer or director? In certain such
cases, it may be obvious that the "shareholder" action is a
spurious attempt to circumvent the rule barring management
345
suits, but in other cases making that judgment would be
more difficult.
Similarly, it is not clear that a rule barring manage-
ment suits against bidders could effectively prevent managers
69
from finding a third-party plaintiff to sue on their behalf.
However the rule might be phrased, it seems certain that some
covert system of signals would be available by which target
management could secure the services of a plaintiff's attor-
ney or, perhaps more likely, an institutional law firm that
could find a group of shareholders to protect.
A more promising avenue of reform might be to continue
to permit target management suits, but to subject litigious
target managers to certain rules designed to mitigate their
self-interest. One such solution, for example, might be to
346
outlaw all defensive responses except litigation. Under
such a regime, target lawsuits would be less useful tacti-
cally, since delay would no longer afford target managers the
347
opportunity to erect other barriers against takeover.
Thus, reducing the tactical value of litigation might
decrease the incidence of meritless suits and also sig-
nificantly disable managers from successfully resisting
premium tender offers. Moreover, this approach would
preserve the target's ability to prevent or redress truly
illegal conduct by bidders.
349Moreover, this modified "rule of passivity" would not
350
entirely eliminate the tactical value of litigation, and
even if it did, such a rule seems an "increasingly futile
351 ...hope." Moreover, it could in fact backfire. If litigation
were the only tactic that target management could invoke to
thwart tender offers, more barely colorable lawsuits might be
70
brought for want of other options. A less extreme solution
may therefore hold greater promise.
For instance, target managers who sue hostile bidders
could be denied the protections of the business judgment rule
and instead be required to demonstrate the compelling busi-
352
ness purpose of their lawsuits. This more stringent stand-
ard would discourage target managers from suing reflexively
in an effort to thwart unwanted tender offers. As with the
modified passivity rule mentioned above, the result might be
to reduce the likelihood of both frivolous litigation and the
defeat of value-increasing bids. And, again, under this ap-
proach managers could still pursue bona fide legal claims
against bidders.
Nevertheless, courts have only recently begun to con-
sider abandonment of the business judgment rule as the proper
353
standard for evaluating takeover defensive measures. Ac-
cordingly, at least until the courts demonstrate a greater
willingness to subject defensive measures to a more rigorous
test, it may make sense to consider other alternatives as
well
.
One broad response to target management's conflict of
interest is suggested by Professor Coffee in his article on
354this issue. " His proposal, to compensate terminated
355
managers through the use of "golden parachutes," " would
plainly reduce management's incentive to resist hostile
takeovers
.
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Professor Coffee's proposal is appealing, not least be-
cause it seeks to abate target management's conflict of in-
terest through positive rather than negative incentives.
But Coffee himself recognizes that the optimal response to
target management's urge to resist hostile bids is to temper
the management's self-interest through negative and positive
357incentives
.
In response to all of the foregoing two proposals emerge.
First, and most basically, one could impose cash
penalties on target managers who assert frivolous claims.
358Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already
authorizes courts to sanction lawyers who sign pleadings or
motions that are without merit or interposed for an improper
359purpose such as harassment or delay. Enforcing a similar
rule against target managers themselves might significantly
alter their strategic calculus and thereby reduce their in-
3 fi f)
centive to sue bidders for merely tactical reasons. The
result, arguably, would be a decrease in groundless target
litigation and a declining use of lawsuits to resist value
increasing bids.
Alternatively, in recognition of the target management's
conflict of interest, managers might be required initially to
finance target lawsuits out of their own funds, with
reimbursement or indemnification available from the target
corporation upon a showing that the lawsuit was warranted.
Of course, what all these proposals share in common is
their skeptical attitude toward target litigation: all, in
72
one way or another, would treat target lawsuits with greater
suspicion than actions brought by other plaintiffs. In the
final analysis, taking this view of target litigation is more
important than agreement on one proposal or another. Cur-
rently, the costs of target lawsuits far outweigh their
benefits, principally because of the conflict of interest
that influences target managers. Tempering that conflict
would blunt a costly takeover defense while preserving a
valuable means of asserting meritorious legal claims against
bidders. Ultimately, this would benefit not only target
shareholders, but also society at large.
NOTES
1. Adapted from 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, Takeovers &
Freezouts (1986)
.
2. For a discussion of target lawsuits and their legal
bases, see Chapter II infra .
2a. "It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the
mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than
an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12
of this title." 15 U.S. C. §78n (a) (1984).
2b. 15 U.S.C. §578m (d)-(e), 78 n (d)-(f) (1984).
2c. "(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or
indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity
security of a class which is registered pursuant to
section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an
insurance company which would have been required to be
so registered except for the exemption contained in
section 12(g) (2) (G) of this title, or any equity
security issued by a closed-end investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days
after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the
security at its principal executive office, by regis-
tered or certified mail, send to each exchange where
the security is traded, and file with the Commission,
a statement containing such of the following informa-
tion, and such additional information, as the Commission
may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors:
(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizen-
ship of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by,
such person and all other persons by whom or on whose
behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
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(B) the source and amount of the funds or other con-
sideration used or to be used in making the purchases,
and if any part of the purchase price is represented
or is to be represented by funds or other considera-
tion borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a descrip-
tion of the transaction and the names of the parties
thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan
made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as
defined in section 3(a) (6) of this title, if the person
filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank
shall not be made available to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective pur-
chases is to acquire control of the business of the
issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell
its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to
make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure.
(D) the number of shares of such security which are
beneficially owned, and the number of shares concerning
which there is a right to acquire, directly or in-
directly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate
of such person, giving the background, identity,
residence, and citizenship of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or un-
derstandings with any person with respect to any
securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan
or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of
loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits,
division of losses or profits, or the giving or withhold-
ing of proxies, naming the persons with whom such con-
tracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered
into, and giving the details thereof.
(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth
in the statements to the issuer and the exchange, and in
the statement filed with the Commission, an amendment
shall be transmitted to the issuer and the exchange and
shall be filed with the Commission, in accordance with
such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities
of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a
"person" for the purposes of this subsection.
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(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any
percentage of a class of any security, such class shall
be deemed to consist of the amount of the outstanding
securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of
such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer.
(5) The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order,
may permit any person to file in lieu of the statement
required by paragraph (1) of this subsection or the rules
and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of
such person, the number of shares of any equity
securities subject to paragraph (1) which are owned by
him, the date of their acquisition and such other infor-
mation as the Commission may specify, if it appears to
the Commission that such securities were acquired by such
person in the ordinary course of his business and were
not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the ef-
fect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer
nor in connection with or as a participant having such
purpose or effect.
(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
to:
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made
or proposed to be made by means of a registration state-
ment under the Securities Act of 1933;
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a
security which, together with all other acquisitions by
the same person of securities of the same class during
the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum
of that class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer
of such security;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security
which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by or-
der, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection
as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having
the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the
issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the pur-
poses of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §78m (d)
.
"(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly, by use of the mails or by means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a na-
tional securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender
offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any
class of any equity security which is registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an
insurance company which would have been required to be so
registered except for the exemption contained in section
12(g) (2) (G) of this title, or any equity security issued
by a closed-end investment company registered under the
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Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation
thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be
the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such
class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request
or invitation are first published or sent or given to
security holders such person has filed with the Commis-
sion a statement containing such of the information
specified in section 13(d) of this title, and such addi-
tional information as the Commission may by rules and
regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. All
requests or invitations for tenders or advertisements
making a tender offer or requesting or inviting tenders
of such a security shall be filed as a part of such
statement and shall contain such of the information con-
tained in such statement as the Commission may by rules
and regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional
material soliciting or requesting such tender offers sub-
sequent to the initial solicitation or request shall con-
tain such information as the Commission may by rules and
regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, and
shall be filed with the Commission not later than the
time copies of such material are first published or sent
or given to security holders. Copies of all statements,
in the form in which such material is furnished to
security holders and the Commission, shall be sent to the
issuer not later than the date such material is first
published or sent or given to any security holders.
(2) When two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities
of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a
"person" for purposes of this subsection.
(3) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any
percentage of a class of any security, such class shall
be deemed to consist of the amount of outstanding
securities of such class, exclusive of any securities or
such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer.
(4) Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of
such a security to accept or reject a tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders shall be made in ac-
cordance with such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
(5) Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders may be withdrawn by or
on behalf of the depositor at any time until the
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expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies
of the offer or request or invitation are first published
or sent or given to security holders, and at any time
after sixty days from the date of the original tender of-
fer or request or invitation, except as the Commission
may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or order
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
(6) Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or
invitation for tenders, for less than all the outstanding
equity securities of a class, and where a greater number
of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten
days after copies of the offer or request or invitation
are first published or sent or given to security holders
than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay
for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly
as may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to
the number of securities deposited by each depositor.
The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to
securities deposited within ten days after notice of an
increase in the consideration offered to security
holders, as described in paragraph (7) , is first pub-
lished or sent or given to security holders.
(7) Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer
or request or invitation for tenders before the expira-
tion thereof by increasing the consideration offered to
holders of such securities, such person shall pay the in-
creased consideration to each security holder whose
securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether
or not such securities have been taken up by such person
before the variation of the tender offer or request or
invitation.
(8) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
any offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of,
any security:
(A) if the acquisition of such security, together with
all other acquisitions by the same person of securities
of the same class during the preceding twelve months,
would not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(B) by the issuer of such security; or
(C) which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by
order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsec-
tion as not entered into for the purpose of, and not
having the effect of, changing or influencing the control
of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the
purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §78n (d) (1984).
"It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements
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made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connec-
tion with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in op-
position to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipula-
tive." 15 U.S.C. §78n (e) (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal
securities law disclosure and reporting requirements, see
Chapter II, Paragraph C, infra .
2d MacFadden Holding, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 92,439 at 94,588
(2d Cir. Aug. 8, 1986). SEC v. World Wide Comm. Invest-
ments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 754 (N.D. Ga . 1983),
citing Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2e. The Securities and Exchange Commission has amended Rule
14e-l, 17 C.F.R. §240, 14C-1, to provide that a tender
offer must remain open for 10 business days after the an-
nouncement of an increase in the amount of securities
being sought by the bidder. See Exchange Act Release No.
22791, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
,
paragraph
83,955 (Jan. 14, 1986). In addition, the SEC adopted a
new rule, Rule 14d-10, to make explicit that in third-
party tender offers the bidder's offer must (i) be open
to all holders of the class of securities subject to the
tender offer and (ii) provide that all security holders
be offered to the highest consideration offered to any
security holder. Rule 13e-4, governing issuer tender of-
fers, was similarly amended. Exchange Act Release No.
23,421B [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 84,016
(Sept. 4, 1986). Finally, the SEC has issued a Concept
Release seeking public comment on whether the Williams
Act should apply when a person acquires a "substantial"
percentage of a target company's stock during or just
after a tender offer. Exchange Act Release No. 23486,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 84,018 (Julv 31,
1986)
.
2f. See generally Cherno, Tactical Litigation Problems in
Tender Offers
, ALI-ABA New Dimensions in Securities
Litigation: Planning and Strategies (Boston, June 2-3,
1983) .
2g. 15 U.S.C. §78n (d)(1) (1984); Rule 14 d-3, 17 C.F.R.
§240.14 d-3 (1984); 17 C.F.R. §240, 14 d-100 (1984).
2h. 17 C.F.R. §240.14 d-100 (1984). See also SEC Release No.
34-13,787, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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Rep. (CCH)
,
paragraph 81,256 at 88,379-80 (1977). "Safe
harbor" provisions, under which certain types of finan-
cial information are deemed to comply with the require-
ment of Item 9.
2i. See Schedule 14 D-l, Item 10, requiring material informa-
tion as to the applicable regulatory requirements that
must be complied with, or approvals that must be ob-
tained, in connection with the bid, to the extent known
by the bidder after reasonable investigation.
2 j . Such information is expressly required by Schedule
14 D-l, Item 3. Item 10(a) also calls for data of this
nature
.
2k. See Schedule 14 D-l, Item 4.
21. 17 C.F.R. §240.10 b-13 (1984).
2m. E.g. , Items 2(e) and (f) of Schedule 14 D-l require dis-
closure of criminal conviction and certain injunctions
involving the bidder. 17 C.F.R. §14 d-100 (1984). See
generally Branch & Rubright, Integrity of Management Dis-
closures under the Federal Securities Laws , 3 7 Bus. Law
1447 (1982)
.
2n. U.S.C. §18 (1984). Section 7 provides in relevant part:
"No person .... shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock . . . and no person . .
.
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person . . . where . . . the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal an-
titrust laws, see Chapter II, Paragraph E.l infra .
2o. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1984)
.
2p. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1984) .
2q. 15 U.S.C. §78g(f) (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal
margin regulations, see Chapter II, Paragraph E.2, infra .
2r. 12 C.F.R. §221.1 (a) (1984). "Margin stock" is defined in
12 C.F.R. §221. 3(v) (1984) as "50% of the current market
value, as determined by any reasonable method."
2s. 12 C.F.R. §224.2 (1984) .
2t. 18 U.S.C. §§1961-68 (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under RICO, see
Chapter II, Paragraph E.3 infra .
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2u. 18 U.S.C. §1962.
2v. For a discussion of target lawsuits under state takeover
statutes and regulatory statutes, see Chapter II,
Paragraphs 1 and 2 infra .
2w. For a discussion of target lawsuits under common law, see
Chapter II, Paragraph G infra .
3. See , e.g. , San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real
Estate Investment Trust of America, 701 F.2d 1000, 1003
(1st Cir. 1983) (court notes that the congressional
policy underlying Williams Act "is frustrated by
unjustifiably delaying tender offers"). See generally
,
Chapter II Infra .
4. See , e.g. , Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcess Energy Resources
Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rep. (CCH)
.
paras. 98, 878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
5. See , e.g. , Wander and LeCogue, Boardroom Jitters:
Corporate Control Transactions and Today's Business
Judgment Rule , 42 Bus. Law 29 (1986); Lipton Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom , 3 5 Bus. Law 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom : An Update After One Year , 36 Bus. Law. 1017
(1981); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have Right to Resist Tender Offers , 3 Corp.
L. Rev. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel
, 5 5 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1231 (1980) ;
see als o authorities cited at note 328 infra .
6. While the author believes that his approach to manage-
ment resistance expressed in this essay is respectable
and appropriate in today's economic perspective, and
finds support with certain commentators, the author has
noted that the academic community has developed
approaches which are different from the author's.
Professors Easterbook and Fischel have argued for a rule
of managerial passivity under which management of a
target company could take no action either to resist a
bid, to buy back shares of the target offered to it by a
potential bidder or, to seek another friendly bidder to
make a counter bid. See Easterbrook & Fischel , The
Proper Role of a Targets Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981) ; Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions
,
91 Yale L. J.
698 (1982) ; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk
Costs and Tender Offers , 35 Stan. L. Rev. (1982) . These
challenging articles have drawn a critical response from
those who share the fundamental economic premises as do
Professors Esaterbrook and Fischel and those who do not.
81
For responses written from a basically similar economic
perspective, see , Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers , 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982)
;
Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers; A Reply and Extension , 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23
(1982); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark
Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against
Fiduciary Duties , 1983 A.B.F. Research J. 341; Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers , 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819
(1981) ; Gilson The Case Against Shark Repellent
Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling
Concept
,
34 Stan. L. Rev. 775 (1982) ; Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense
, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982) . For other writers
that have criticized the position of Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel from the vantage point that
shares few of their premises, see , Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target's Boardroom
, 35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An
Update After One Year
, 36 Bus. Law 1017 (1980) ; Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
, 5 5 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1231
(1980); Lowenstein, Prunning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation , 83 Colum. L. Rev.
249 (1983). See also , Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance , 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1145, 1152 (1984); Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web , 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1 (1986). Essentially, Lucian Bebchuck and Pro-
fessor Gilson concur with Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel as to the illegitimacy of defensive tactics which
seek to maintain the target corporation as anindependent
entity. However, both Bebchuck and Gilson believe that
greater allocational efficiency results if target
management is permitted to facilitate competing bids. In
contrast, Professor Lowenstein and Martin Lipton have
argued that it is desirable that target management be
able to resist the takeover, although in Professor
Lowenstein 1 s proposal the authorized scope of resistance
would be limited and would be principally intended to
give shareholders a more informed, or less pressured
choice. Lowenstein, supra , at 322-33. Of all these
commentators only Martin Lipton takes the view that the
normal business judgment discretion accorded to the board
of directors in other areas of corporate law should
extend to the context of corporate control contests. See
Lipton, supra , at 113-20. However, Professor Carney
approaches the same result by conceptualizing the
takeover contest as one between the bidder and the target
shareholders, in which management of the target is
serving as the faithful agent of its shareholders in
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seeking to obtain a higher price for their shares.
Carney, supra , at 322-33..
7. See , e.g. , Gilson, supra note 5, at 826-31. But See
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases , 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1377 (1986) (providing extended analysis
of one defensive tactic, target stock repurchases).
8. Some commentators, for example, almost usually lump
target litigation together with other takeover defenses
they would simply bar as inimical to shareholder
welfare
.
See , e.g. , Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5 at
1192-94; see also Gibson, supra note 5 at 878-79.
In a recent article, however, the impact of target
litigation on the wealth of target shareholders has
been examined. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of
Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge ? 28 J.L. & Econ. 131 (1985).
9. See Chapter III infra .
10. I. M. Lipton & E. Stinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts,
§6.07 (1986); S. Lome, Acquisitions and Mergers:
Negotiated and Contested Transactions, §4.05 [3] [b] [i]
(1985); I. A. Fleisher, Tender Offers: Defenses,
Responses, and Planning 119-44 (2d ed . 1983 & Supp.
1985); E. Aranow, H. Einhorne & G. Berlstein, De-
velopments in Tender Offers for Corporate Control 104-
92 (1977) ; E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for
Corporate Control 266-67 (1973) .
11. See Rosenzweig, Target Litigation , 85 Mich. L. Rev.
110, 112 (1986).
12. See notes 13 and 15-17 infra .
13. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics , 32
Bus. Law 1433, 1437 (1977).
14. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f)
(1982)
.
15. Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far? , 23 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1978).
16. Id. at 689.
17. Id. at 696-97.
18. Arthur, Kirby & Rein, Defamation Suits as a Weapon in
Corporate Control Battles , 37 Bus. Law. 1 (1981). The
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authors deny the increased tendency of courts to hold
that "state securities statutes are preempted by
federal securities laws" and to read "federal
securities and antitrust statutes less expansively,"
concluding that "participants in heated control battles
have good reason to consider new litigation
alternatives, including defamation actions." J_d. at 3.
They note, for instance, that " [i]n corporate control
battles, initiation of litigation often is motivated as
much by short term or tactical considerations as by the
prospects of long-term relief on the merits." I_d. at
8. Thus, they point out that "[a]lmost any plausible
cause of action threatens [the] opponent with burden,
delay, and expense," which they applaud as "a valuable
means of enhancing an opponent's apparent level of
risk." Id. at 11. Similarly, they extol the tactical
value of "expedited and wide-ranging discovery" in
takeover litigation, observing that quite apart from
its relevance to the merits of the care, discovery "may
provide insight into an opponent's tactics and useful
'ammunition' in the form of unfavorable information,
and also may burden an opponent at a time of otherwise
intense demands." Id. at 10.
19. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers , 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1155 (1982).
20. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 671 (5th
ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote is
worth quoting in its entirety: "In reading some of the
cases, one has the feeling that the complaint may have
been drafted in advance with the name of the defendant
left blank, to be filled in as the occasion may
require." I_d. at 671, n.l; see also R. Gilson, The Law
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 642 (1986) ("The
single most common response to an unwanted offer is
litigation."); Cohn , Tender Offers and the Sale of
Control: An Analogue to Determine the Validity of
Target Management Defensive Measures , 66 Iowa L. Rev.
475, 487 (1981) ("Immediate initiation of litigation
seeking a preliminary injunction against the tender
offer proceeding has been almost a knee-jerk reaction
in hostile takeover situations."); H. Kripke, The SEC
and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a
Purpose 270 (1979) (describing tender offer litigation
as "necessarily a game, a series of litigation tactics
with teams ready to fly into action at the first sign
of a tender of fer, ... [where] the concept of law as a
system of justice is completely irrelevant").
21. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets:
Do Interests Diverge in a Merge? , 28 J. L. & Econ.
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151, 160-61 (1985); Rosenzweig, supra note 501, 14
n. 17.
22. See note 12 supra .
23. See note 24 infra .
24. This, however, may be changing as target managers
resort with increasing frequency to so-called
structural defenses such as recapitalization, stock
repurchases, and asset sales. See Coffee, Shareholders
Versus Managers; The Strain in the Corporate Web , 8 5
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6-7, 43-44, 52-60 (1986); see also
note 25 infra (noting the observation of some
takeover lawyers that targets are relying less on
litigation as a defensive measure) . It is also worth
noting that some specialists are careful to counsel
target managers who do sue to assert only meritorious,
bona fide claims. While these specialists recognize
the tactical value of litigation, they clearly reject
the use of litigation for purely tactical reasons.
See , e.g. , 1 A. Fleisher, Tender Offers: Defenses,
Responses, and Planning 229 and note 22 (2d ed . 1983
and Supp. 1985); Reuben & Elden, How to be a Target
Company , 23 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 423, 437-38 (1978).
25. See generally 1 A. Fleisher, supra note 24, at 289-99.
26. See , e.g. , American Gen. Corp. v. NLT Corp., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
,
paragraphs
98, 806 at 94,142 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 1982); Marshall
Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 5 27 F. Supp. 86, 9 9
(E.D.N.Y.), affd
.
, 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Crouse-
Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 456
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) ; D-2 Investment Co. v. Holloway,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
paragraphs 94,771 at 96,562 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Electronic
Speciality Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969). See also note 27 infra and
accompanying text.
27. See , e.g. , Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47,
60 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Although we should not hesitate to
enforce the [Williams] Act's disclosure provisions
through appropriate relief, we must also guard against
improvident or precipitous use of remedies that may
have the effect of favoring one side or the other in a
takeover battle when allegations of violation of the
Act, often made in the heat of the contest, may not be
substantiated. In this context, the preliminary
injunction, which is one of the most drastic tools in
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the arsenals of judicial remedies, must be used with
great care, lest the forces of the free market place,
which in the end should determine the merits of
takeover disputes, are nullified."); Norlin Corpo. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc. 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Developments in corporate control contests often
proceed swiftly, and timing may have a crucial impact
on the outcome.... [T]he courts themselves are too often
drawn into the fray... [I] t is not for us to make the
policy choices that will determine whether this style
of corporate warfare will excalate or diminish.");
Gearhart Indus, v. Smith Intl., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to grant target preliminary
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a player whose self-interest is to monitor management,
and who is poised to mount a proxy fight or a tender
offer."); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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in the ultimate resolution of the dispute between
incumbents and challengers will always occur .... [D] elay
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shareholders . " )
.
28. Cf. notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
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and Contested Transactions, §4 . 05 [3] [6] [i] (1985);
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.
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disclosure must, at bottom, rest upon a finding that the
shareholders are being deprived of information necessary
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of target management is to increase the takeover price
and not to drive away all bids." I_d. at 152-53.
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272. See , e.g. , Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellents and
Poison Pills: Stockholder Protection - From the Good
Guys or the Bad Guys? , 4 Midland Corp. Fin. J. 39, 40
(1986) (arguing that target litigation benefits target
shareholders)
.
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motives, and that target lawsuits diminish shareholder
wealth and impose significant costs on society, target
litigation, can be socially valuable as a means of
enforcing the law. See Yablon, Contention Disclosure
and Corporate Takeovers
, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 429, 429-30
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standing for private attorneys general: a plaintiff's
self-interest in prosecuting a claim vigorously can
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generally Frankel, Implied Rights of Action , 67 Va. L.
Rev. 553 (1981); Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the
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Troubled Waters
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309. See , e.g. , Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act
Release No. 21079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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the social costs that can arise from unfettered liti-
gation by self-interested target managers.
312. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1412-28
(arguing that allowing defensive self-tenders, subject
to requirements that they be nondiscriminatory and for
no fewer than the number of shares being sought by the
bidder, assures that control-winning bid will be made by
the management that can maximize the value of the
target)
.
313. See , Bebchuck, supra note 309, at 1742-44.
314. See also Carney, supra note 298 (proposing use of
fair-price charter amendments as lowest-cost response to
value-decreasing two-tier bids)
.
315. See, e.g. , Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at
1408-12; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 269, at 6; Bradley,
supra note 342. These commentators recognize that the
gains that accrue to target shareholders may derive from
any of a number of sources; they do not assume that
tender-offer gains generally result from the ouster of
inefficient or self-dealing target managers. Instead,
they favor a "general synergy theory" to the effect that
the sources of takeover gains may vary from one trans-
action to the next. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 276, at 1409-11 (discussing alternative sources of
takeover gains and rejecting notion of a general theory
explaining tender offers; Gilson, supra note 254, at
853, 873-74; Bebchuck, supra note 305.
316. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276. "...fair
competition among rival management teams can prevent
acquiring firms from effecting value-decreasing
takeovers and target managers from defeating
value-increasing acquisitions." Id., at 1411.
317. Numerous courts have noted that target lawsuits against
bidders can significantly tip the competitive balance in
takeover battles. See , e.g. , Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp. 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985); Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984);
Gearhart Indus, v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715
(5th Cir. 1984); Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v.
Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566 (11th Cir. 1984); Equity
Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
507, 511, 514 (D. Utah 1983); Marshall Field & Co. v.
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Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Standard
Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Gateway Indus, v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. 111. 1980).
For recent decisions discussing more generally the
importance of an "even playing field" in corporate
control contests, see Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (enjoining target managers from
attempt to exempt leveraged buyout proposal from
appraisal provisions, on ground that exemption would
unfairly disadvantage competing interfirm bidder)
;
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. 781 F.2d
264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (enjoining "lock-up option" on
ground that it inappropriately favored one bidder)
;
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A. 2d
173, 184 (Del. 1986) (same with respect to "no-shop"
provision)
.
See also Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276 at 1406-08
(arguing that advantaging one management team in a
control contest contravenes the neutrality principle
embodied in the Williams Act)
.
318. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1421-27
(proposing safeguards that would prevent target managers
from using defensive self-tender offers to defeat
value-increasing acquisitions)
.
319. See Bebchuck, supra note 309, at 1743.
320. See Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 139.
321. See Chapter I, supra .
322. See note 281 supra and accompanying text.
323. See generally E. Aranow, H. Einhorn & G. Berlstein,
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
107-93 (1977) (surveying target lawsuit claims and
standing issues)
.
324. The mentality that lawyers have helped to create
regarding anti-takeover lawsuits arguably reinforces
this belief in target managers. But see note 285 supra .
325. Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 142.
326. For example, transfer sales between parent and
subsidiary corporations in which products are purchased
at below-market prices or sold at above-market prices.
See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1412 n.
129.
327. Rosenzweig, supra note 257 at 142.
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328. See , e.g. , Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-57 (6th
Cir. 1985); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert , denied , 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
380-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701-04 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert .
denied , 450 U.S. 999 (1981) . But see Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(invalidating grant of lockup option as breach of
directors' fiduciary duties); Dynamics Corp. of America
v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming
injunction against enforcement of shareholder rights
plan adopted by target management) ; Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984)
(narrowing circumstances in which business judgment rule
will apply to takeover defenses) ; Minster Acquiring
Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (shifting to target managers burden of showing
propriety of defensive tactics in certain circum-
stances) ; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that management's
grant of lock-up option to one of two competing bidders
constituted breach of fiduciary duty)
.
329. See , e.g. , Gearhart Indus. V. Smith Intl., Inc., 741
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md . 1982) (counter
tender offer) ; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. , 493
A. 2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory self-tender
offer); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346
(Del. 1985) (share purchase rights plan).
330. See , e.g. , Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir.), cert , denied , 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Grumman
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F.Supp. 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D.
Mich. 1978) ; Commonwealth Oil Ref . Co. v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp., 394 F.Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
331. See note 276 supra and accompanying text.
332. See Bebchuck, supra note 254; Bebchuck , The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension , 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1982); Cohn , supra note
20; Gilson, supra note 52; Gilson, supra note 274.
333. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer , 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers , 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982);
Schwartz, supra note 273.
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334. See Bebchuck, supra note 254, at 1029; Bebchuck, supra
note 53, at 1743; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
333, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 52, at
878-79, Leebron, supra note 274, at 217-19.
335. See note 276 supra and accompanying text.
336. See notes 315-317 supra and accompanying text.
337. See , e.g. , authorities cited at note 32 supra .
338. See note 297 supra .
339. Both the common law, see
,
e.g. , Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970), and modern state corporation
codes, see
,
e.g.
,
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law and 626 McKinney
(1986); Del. Code Ann. §327 (1983); Model Bus. Corp.
Act. §7.40 (1986), authorize shareholders to sue
derivatively on behalf of their corporation to redress
corporate injuries. While one usually thinks of deri-
vative actions as a means of enforcing management+s
fiduciary obligations, see , e.g. , Fischel & Bradley, The
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis , 71
Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986); Coffee, The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation
,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5;
Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project
,
35 Stan. L. Rev. 927
(1983); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working , 42 MD. L. Rev. 215 (1983); Coffee & Schwartz,
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and
a Proposal for Legislative Reform , 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261
(1981) , they have always been available for the
assertion of claims against third parties as well. See
United Cooper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244
U.S. 261 (1917); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
Of course, it is axiomatic that shareholders may bring
derivative actions only to vindicate rights belonging to
the corporation. See generally W. Cary & M. Eisenberg,
Corporations 869-99 (5th ed. unabridged 1980) ; H. Henn &
J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, §360 (3d ed. 1983) .
340. See , e.g. , Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light and Power Assn.,
257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W. 2d 423 (1960); Denney v.
Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964);
Tanzer v. Huffines, 345 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1972).
See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stock-
holder's Derivative Suits , 39 Colum. L. Rev. 784 (1939);
Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and
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Derivative Suits
, 3 J. Corpo. L. 267 (1978); Leubsdorf,
The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards
, 90 Yale
L. J. 473 (1981)
.
341. See , e
.
g. , Fischel & Bradley, supra note 339, at 271
(noting that plaintiff's attorney "has very little
incentive to consider the effect of the action on [the]
shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries, who ultimately
bear the costs"); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General
,
supra note 612, at 232 ("[T]he plaintiff's
attorney is subject to a serious conflict of
interest. . . . " ) . See generally Coffee , Unfaithful
Champion , supra note 339.
342. See generally
,
Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research
and the Shareholder Derivative Suit; Toward a
Better-Informed Debate , Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1985, at 137.
343. See , e.g. , Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363, 371 (1966) ; see also Coffee, Unfaithful Champion
,
supra note 339, at 13, for an economic analysis of why
lawyers find it worthwhile to bring frivolous actions.
See generally , Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcment of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions
, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986) .
344. For proposals designed to align more closely the in-
terests of derivative and class action lawyers and their
clients, see Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General , supra note 339; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion ,
supra note 612.
345. Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(denying bidder standing, qua target shareholder, to sue
competing bidder for damages under §14 (e) of the
Williams Act)
.
346. Cf. Baron Tender Offers and Management Resistance ,
38 J. Fin. 331, 342 (1983) (proposing ban on all
defensive measures); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 333, at 1198 (same); Gilson, supra note 52, at
878-79 (proposing ban on all defensive measures except
those that might facilitate an auction for the target's
shares); Bebchuck, supra note 332, at 1029 (same).
347. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
348. See note 297 supra and accompanying text.
349. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 333, at 1201
(proposing a "rule of passivity" forbidding management
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from employing and defensive tactic, including
litigation)
.
350. Target managers, for example, might still be tempted to
sue bidders in the hope that their lawsuit might be a
"show-stopper." While the increasing reluctance of
courts to enjoin tender offers makes this result less
likely than it once was, and while "show-stoppers" are
rare where the target's lawsuit is purely tactical,
self-interested managers would have little reason to
refrain from suing. Similarly, other strategic
considerations that induce target managers to litigate
would be largely unaffected by the suggested passivity
rule.
351. Coffee, supra note 24, at 15.
352. Or, to put this more broadly, the propriety of target
suits could be judged by reference to management's duty
of loyalty rather than its duty of care. See Oesterle,
Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target
Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity
Thesis , 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 69, 88-89 (1985)
(proposing that target managers be required to show by
clear and convincing evidence why acts designed to
defeat a tender offer are in shareholders' best
interests, but suggesting that managers able to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that a potentially
"reversible" defense (such as litigation) was invoked
only as a negotiating play, be permitted to justify
their action by demonstrating by preponderance of the
evidence the reasonableness of their gambles)
.
353. See authorities cited at note 328 supra .
354. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web
,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
355. A "golden parachute" is a contract with (usually) the
top employees of a corporation which is designed to
provide financial protection to an employee in the event
of a takeover or change in control. Insofar as
financial awards to outgoing employees deplete the
assets of the corporation, the presence of such
contracts may make the corporation less attractive to a
bidder. See , e.g. , Kramer v. Western Pacific
Industries, Inc., Civ. No. 8675, slip op. (Del. Ch
.
Nov. 7, 19 86)
.
356. See Coffee, supra note 354, at 106.
357. Id.. Moreover, to the extent that managers placated by
golden parachutes may be less likely to act to stimulate
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auctions, such provisions may impose substantial costs
on target shareholders. While a manager with a golden
parachute would be rewarded whether the company is taken
over by the initial or a subsequent bidder, if the
manager values the golden parachute more than he values
control of the company, he may prefer the former, since
earlier rewards are worth more than later ones and an
effort to stimulate an auction could defeat the initial
bid without enticing others to enter the bidding. Cf
,
id . at 107 (responding to claim that golden parachutes
may be "indecent and even corrupting").
358. Fed. R. Civ. , P. 11.
359. See generally, Notre, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Pre-
venting Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional
Responsibility , 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 300 (1986) ; Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment , 74 Geo. L.J. 1313 (1986) ; S. Kassin, An
Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions (1985) .
360. Moreover, since rejection of the business judgment rule
would address the problem of frivolous target litigation
only indirectly, imposing direct penalties for the
filing of meritless claims would seem sensible even if
the courts were to hold litigious managers to a higher
standard. See generally R. Clark, Corporate Law §1510
(1986)
.
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